

Statement of Policies and Procedures for Proxy Voting

1. Introduction

As a registered investment adviser, AllianceBernstein L.P. (“**AllianceBernstein**”, “**we**” or “**us**”) has a fiduciary duty to act solely in the best interests of our clients. We recognize that this duty requires us to vote client securities in a timely manner and make voting decisions that are intended to maximize long-term shareholder value. Generally, our clients’ objective is to maximize the financial return of their portfolios within appropriate risk parameters. We have long recognized that environmental, social and governance (“**ESG**”) issues can impact the performance of investment portfolios. Accordingly, we have sought to integrate ESG factors into our investment process to the extent that the integration of such factors is consistent with our fiduciary duty to help our clients achieve their investment objectives and protect their economic interests. Our Statement of Policy Regarding Responsible Investment (“**RI Policy**”) is attached to this Statement as an Exhibit.

We consider ourselves shareholder advocates and take this responsibility very seriously. Consistent with our commitments, we will disclose our clients’ voting records only to them and as required by mutual fund vote disclosure regulations. In addition, our proxy committees may, after careful consideration, choose to respond to surveys so long as doing so does not compromise confidential voting.

This statement is intended to comply with Rule 206(4)-6 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. It sets forth our policies and procedures for voting proxies for our discretionary investment advisory clients, including investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. This statement applies to AllianceBernstein’s investment groups investing on behalf of clients in both U.S. and non-U.S. securities.

2. Proxy Policies

Our proxy voting policies are principle-based rather than rules-based. We adhere to a core set of principles that are described in this Statement and in our Proxy Voting Manual. We assess each proxy proposal in light of those principles. Our proxy voting “litmus test” will always be

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what we view as most likely to maximize long-term shareholder value. We believe that authority and accountability for setting and executing corporate policies, goals and compensation should generally rest with the board of directors and senior management. In return, we support strong investor rights that allow shareholders to hold directors and management accountable if they fail to act in the best interests of shareholders. In addition, if we determine that ESG issues that arise with respect to an issuer's past, current or anticipated behaviors are, or are reasonably likely to become, material to its future earnings, we address these concerns in our proxy voting and engagement.

This statement is designed to be responsive to the wide range of proxy voting subjects that can have a significant effect on the investment value of the securities held in our clients' accounts. These policies are not exhaustive due to the variety of proxy voting issues that we may be required to consider. AllianceBernstein reserves the right to depart from these guidelines in order to make voting decisions that are in our clients' best interests. In reviewing proxy issues, we will apply the following general policies:

2.1. Corporate Governance

We recognize the importance of good corporate governance in our proxy voting policies and engagement practices in ensuring that management and the board of directors fulfill their obligations to shareholders. We favor proposals promoting transparency and accountability within a company. We support the appointment of a majority of independent directors on key committees and generally support separating the positions of chairman and chief executive officer, except in cases where a company has sufficient counter-balancing governance in place. Because we believe that good corporate governance requires shareholders to have a meaningful voice in the affairs of the company, we generally will support shareholder proposals which request that companies amend their by-laws to provide that director nominees be elected by an affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast. Furthermore, we have written to the SEC in support of shareholder access to corporate proxy statements under specified conditions with the goal of serving the best interests of all shareholders.

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2.2. Elections of Directors

Unless there is a proxy fight for seats on the Board or we determine that there are other compelling reasons for withholding votes for directors, we will vote in favor of the management proposed slate of directors. That said, we believe that directors have a duty to respond to shareholder actions that have received significant shareholder support. Therefore, we may withhold votes for directors (or vote against directors in non-U.S. markets) who fail to act on key issues such as failure to implement proposals to declassify boards, failure to implement a majority vote requirement, failure to submit a rights plan to a shareholder vote or failure to act on tender offers where a majority of shareholders have tendered their shares. (We may vote against directors under these circumstances if the company has adopted a majority voting policy because, if a company has adopted such a policy, withholding votes from directors is not possible.) In addition, we will withhold votes for directors who fail to attend at least seventy-five percent of board meetings within a given year without a reasonable excuse, and we may abstain or vote against directors of non-U.S. issuers where there is insufficient information about the nominees disclosed in the proxy statement. Also, we will generally not withhold votes for directors who meet the definition of independence promulgated by the primary exchange on which the company's shares are traded or set forth in the code we determine to be best practice in the country where the subject company is domiciled. Finally, because we believe that cumulative voting in single shareholder class structures provides a disproportionately large voice to minority shareholders in the affairs of a company, we will generally vote against such proposals and vote for management proposals seeking to eliminate cumulative voting. However, in dual class structures (such as A&B shares) where the shareholders with a majority economic interest have a minority voting interest, we will generally vote in favor of cumulative voting.

2.3. Appointment of Auditors

AllianceBernstein believes that the company is in the best position to choose its auditors, so we will generally support management's recommendation. However, we recognize that there are inherent conflicts when a company's independent auditor performs substantial non-audit services for the company. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

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prohibits certain categories of services by auditors to U.S. issuers, making this issue less prevalent in the U.S. Nevertheless, in reviewing a proposed auditor, we will consider the fees paid for non-audit services relative to total fees and whether there are other reasons for us to question the independence or performance of the auditors.

2.4. Changes in Legal and Capital Structure

Changes in a company's charter, articles of incorporation or by-laws are often technical and administrative in nature. Absent a compelling reason to the contrary, AllianceBernstein will cast its votes in accordance with management's recommendations on such proposals. However, we will review and analyze on a case-by-case basis any non-routine proposals that are likely to affect the structure and operation of the company or have a material economic effect on the company. For example, we will generally support proposals to increase authorized common stock when it is necessary to implement a stock split, aid in a restructuring or acquisition, or provide a sufficient number of shares for an employee savings plan, stock option plan or executive compensation plan. However, a satisfactory explanation of a company's intentions must be disclosed in the proxy statement for proposals requesting an increase of greater than 100% of the shares outstanding. We will oppose increases in authorized common stock where there is evidence that the shares will be used to implement a poison pill or another form of anti-takeover device. We will support shareholder proposals that seek to eliminate dual class voting structures.

2.5. Corporate Restructurings, Mergers and Acquisitions

AllianceBernstein believes proxy votes dealing with corporate reorganizations are an extension of the investment decision. Accordingly, we will analyze such proposals on a case-by-case basis, weighing heavily the views of our research analysts that cover the company and our investment professionals managing the portfolios in which the stock is held.

2.6. Proposals Affecting Shareholder Rights

AllianceBernstein believes that certain fundamental rights of shareholders must be protected. We will generally vote in favor of proposals that give shareholders a greater voice in the affairs of the company and oppose any measure that seeks to limit those

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rights. However, when analyzing such proposals we will weigh the financial impact of the proposal against the impairment of shareholder rights.

2.7. Anti-Takeover Measures

AllianceBernstein believes that measures that impede corporate transactions (such as takeovers) or entrench management not only infringe on the rights of shareholders but may also have a detrimental effect on the value of the company. Therefore, we will generally oppose proposals, regardless of whether they are advanced by management or shareholders, when their purpose or effect is to entrench management or excessively or inappropriately dilute shareholder ownership. Conversely, we support proposals that would restrict or otherwise eliminate anti-takeover or anti-shareholder measures that have already been adopted by corporate issuers. For example, we will support shareholder proposals that seek to require the company to submit a shareholder rights plan to a shareholder vote. We will evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, proposals to completely redeem or eliminate such plans. Furthermore, we will generally oppose proposals put forward by management (including the authorization of blank check preferred stock, classified boards and supermajority vote requirements) that appear to be anti-shareholder or intended as management entrenchment mechanisms.

2.8. Executive Compensation

AllianceBernstein believes that company management and the compensation committee of the board of directors should, within reason, be given latitude to determine the types and mix of compensation and benefits offered to company employees. Whether proposed by a shareholder or management, we will review proposals relating to executive compensation plans on a case-by-case basis to ensure that the long-term interests of management and shareholders are properly aligned. In general, we will analyze the proposed plan to ensure that shareholder equity will not be excessively diluted taking into account shares available for grant under the proposed plan as well as other existing plans. We generally will oppose plans that allow stock options to be granted with below market value exercise prices on the date of issuance or permit repricing of underwater stock options without shareholder approval. Other factors such as the company's performance and industry practice will generally be factored into our

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analysis. In markets where remuneration reports are not required for all companies, we will generally support shareholder proposals asking the board to adopt a policy (*i.e.*, “say on pay”) that the company’s shareholders be given the opportunity to vote on an advisory resolution to approve the compensation committee’s report. Although “say on pay” votes are by nature only broad indications of shareholder views, they do lead to more compensation-related dialogue between management and shareholders and help ensure that management and shareholders meet their common objective: maximizing the value of the company. In markets where votes to approve remuneration reports are required, we review the reports on a case-by-case basis. With respect to companies that have received governmental assistance through government programs such as TARP, we will generally oppose shareholder proposals that seek to impose greater executive compensation restrictions on subject companies than are required under the applicable program because such restrictions could create a competitive disadvantage for the subject company. We believe the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) took appropriate steps to ensure more complete and transparent disclosure of executive compensation when it issued modified executive compensation and corporate governance disclosure rules in 2006 and February 2010. Therefore, while we will consider them on a case-by-case basis, we generally vote against shareholder proposals seeking additional disclosure of executive and director compensation, including proposals that seek to specify the measurement of performance-based compensation, if the company is subject to SEC rules. Finally, we will support requiring a shareholder vote on management proposals to provide severance packages that exceed 2.99 times the sum of an executive officer’s base salary plus bonus that are triggered by a change in control. Finally, we will support shareholder proposals requiring a company to expense compensatory employee stock options (to the extent the jurisdiction in which the company operates does not already require it) because we view this form of compensation as a significant corporate expense that should be appropriately accounted for.

2.9. ESG

We are appointed by our clients as an investment manager with a fiduciary responsibility to help them achieve their investment objectives over the long term. Generally, our

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clients' objective is to maximize the financial return of their portfolios within appropriate risk parameters. We have long recognized that ESG issues can impact the performance of investment portfolios. Accordingly, we have sought to integrate ESG factors into our investment and proxy voting processes to the extent that the integration of such factors is consistent with our fiduciary duty to help our clients achieve their investment objectives and protect their economic interests. For additional information regarding our approach to incorporating ESG issues in our investment and decision-making processes, please refer to our RI Policy, which is attached to this Statement as an Exhibit.

Shareholder proposals relating to environmental, social (including political) and governance issues often raise complex and controversial issues that may have both a financial and non-financial effect on the company. And while we recognize that the effect of certain policies on a company may be difficult to quantify, we believe it is clear that they do affect the company's long-term performance. Our position in evaluating these proposals is founded on the principle that we are a fiduciary. As such, we carefully consider any factors that we believe could affect a company's long-term investment performance (including ESG issues) in the course of our extensive fundamental, company-specific research and engagement, which we rely on in making our investment and proxy voting decisions. Maximizing long-term shareholder value is our overriding concern in considering these matters, so we consider the impact of these proposals on the future earnings of the company. In so doing, we will balance the assumed cost to a company of implementing one or more shareholder proposals against the positive effects we believe implementing the proposal may have on long-term shareholder value.

3. Proxy Voting Procedures

3.1. Proxy Voting Committees

Our growth and value investment groups have formed separate proxy voting committees (“**Proxy Committees**”) to establish general proxy policies for AllianceBernstein and consider specific proxy voting matters as necessary. These Proxy Committees periodically review these policies and new types of corporate governance issues, and decide how we should vote on proposals not covered by these policies. When a proxy

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vote cannot be clearly decided by an application of our stated policy, the appropriate Proxy Committee will evaluate the proposal. In addition, the Proxy Committees, in conjunction with the analyst that covers the company, may contact corporate management, interested shareholder groups and others as necessary to discuss proxy issues. Members of the Proxy Committees include senior investment personnel and representatives of the Legal and Compliance Department.

Different investment philosophies may occasionally result in different conclusions being drawn regarding certain proposals and, in turn, may result in the Proxy Committees making different voting decisions on the same proposal for value and growth holdings. Nevertheless, the Proxy Committees always vote proxies with the goal of maximizing the value of the securities in client portfolios.

It is the responsibility of the Proxy Committees to evaluate and maintain proxy voting procedures and guidelines, to evaluate proposals and issues not covered by these guidelines, to evaluate proxies where we face a potential conflict of interest (as discussed below), to consider changes in policy and to review the Proxy Voting Statement and the Proxy Voting Manual no less frequently than annually. In addition, the Proxy Committees meet as necessary to address special situations.

3.2. Engagement

In evaluating proxy issues and determining our votes, we welcome and seek out the points of view of various parties. Internally, the Proxy Committees may consult chief investment officers, directors of research, research analysts across our value and growth equity platforms, portfolio managers in whose managed accounts a stock is held and/or other Investment Policy Group members. Externally, the Proxy Committees may consult company management, company directors, interest groups, shareholder activists and research providers. If we believe an ESG issue is, or is reasonably likely to become, material, we engage a company's management to discuss the relevant issues.

Our engagement with companies and interest groups continues to expand as we have had more such meetings in the past few years.

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3.3. Conflicts of Interest

AllianceBernstein recognizes that there may be a potential conflict of interest when we vote a proxy solicited by an issuer whose retirement plan we manage or administer, who distributes AllianceBernstein-sponsored mutual funds, or with whom we have, or one of our employees has, a business or personal relationship that may affect (or may be reasonably viewed as affecting) how we vote on the issuer's proxy. Similarly, AllianceBernstein may have a potentially material conflict of interest when deciding how to vote on a proposal sponsored or supported by a shareholder group that is a client. We believe that centralized management of proxy voting, oversight by the proxy voting committees and adherence to these policies ensures that proxies are voted based solely on our clients' best interests. Additionally, we have implemented procedures to ensure that our votes are not the product of a material conflict of interest, including: (i) on an annual basis, the Proxy Committees taking reasonable steps to evaluate (A) the nature of AllianceBernstein's and our employees' material business and personal relationships (and those of our affiliates) with any company whose equity securities are held in client accounts and (B) any client that has sponsored or has a material interest in a proposal upon which we will be eligible to vote; (ii) requiring anyone involved in the decision making process to disclose to the chairman of the appropriate Proxy Committee any potential conflict that he or she is aware of (including personal relationships) and any contact that he or she has had with any interested party regarding a proxy vote; (iii) prohibiting employees involved in the decision making process or vote administration from revealing how we intend to vote on a proposal in order to reduce any attempted influence from interested parties; and (iv) where a material conflict of interests exists, reviewing our proposed vote by applying a series of objective tests and, where necessary, considering the views of third party research services to ensure that our voting decision is consistent with our clients' best interests.

Because under certain circumstances AllianceBernstein considers the recommendation of third party research services, the Proxy Committees takes reasonable steps to verify that any third party research service is, in fact, independent taking into account all of the relevant facts and circumstances. This includes reviewing the third party research service's conflict management procedures and ascertaining, among other things, whether

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the third party research service (i) has the capacity and competency to adequately analyze proxy issues, and (ii) can make recommendations in an impartial manner and in the best interests of our clients.

3.4. Proxies of Certain Non-U.S. Issuers

Proxy voting in certain countries requires “share blocking.” Shareholders wishing to vote their proxies must deposit their shares shortly before the date of the meeting with a designated depository. During this blocking period, shares that will be voted at the meeting cannot be sold until the meeting has taken place and the shares are returned to the clients’ custodian banks. Absent compelling reasons to the contrary, AllianceBernstein believes that the benefit to the client of exercising the vote is outweighed by the cost of voting (*i.e.*, not being able to sell the shares during this period). Accordingly, if share blocking is required we generally choose not to vote those shares.

AllianceBernstein seeks to vote all proxies for securities held in client accounts for which we have proxy voting authority. However, in non-US markets administrative issues beyond our control may at times prevent AllianceBernstein from voting such proxies. For example, AllianceBernstein may receive meeting notices after the cut-off date for voting or without sufficient time to fully consider the proxy. As another example, certain markets require periodic renewals of powers of attorney that local agents must have from our clients prior to implementing AllianceBernstein’s voting instructions.

3.5. Loaned Securities

Many clients of AllianceBernstein have entered into securities lending arrangements with agent lenders to generate additional revenue. AllianceBernstein will not be able to vote securities that are on loan under these types of arrangements. However, under rare circumstances, for voting issues that may have a significant impact on the investment, we may request that clients recall securities that are on loan if we determine that the benefit of voting outweighs the costs and lost revenue to the client or fund and the administrative burden of retrieving the securities.

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3.6. Proxy Voting Records

Clients may obtain information about how we voted proxies on their behalf by contacting their AllianceBernstein administrative representative. Alternatively, clients may make a written request for proxy voting information to: Mark R. Manley, Senior Vice President & Chief Compliance Officer, AllianceBernstein L.P., 1345 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10105.

[ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE FOR U.S. MUTUAL FUNDS]

You may obtain information regarding how the Fund voted proxies relating to portfolio securities during the most recent 12-month period ended June 30, without charge. Simply visit AllianceBernstein's web site at www.alliancebernstein.com, go to the Securities and Exchange Commission's web site at www.sec.gov or call AllianceBernstein at (800) 227-4618.

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Exhibit

**Statement of Policy Regarding
Responsible Investment**

**Principles for Responsible Investment,
ESG, and Socially Responsible Investment**

1. Introduction

AllianceBernstein L.P. (“**AllianceBernstein**” or “**we**”) is appointed by our clients as an investment manager with a fiduciary responsibility to help them achieve their investment objectives over the long term. Generally, our clients’ objective is to maximize the financial return of their portfolios within appropriate risk parameters. AllianceBernstein has long recognized that environmental, social and governance (“**ESG**”) issues can impact the performance of investment portfolios. Accordingly, we have sought to integrate ESG factors into our investment process to the extent that the integration of such factors is consistent with our fiduciary duty to help our clients achieve their investment objectives and protect their economic interests.

Our policy draws a distinction between how the Principles for Responsible Investment (“**PRI**” or “**Principles**”), and Socially Responsible Investing (“**SRI**”) incorporate ESG factors. PRI is based on the premise that, because ESG issues can affect investment performance, appropriate consideration of ESG issues and engagement regarding them is firmly within the bounds of a mainstream investment manager’s fiduciary duties to its clients. Furthermore, PRI is intended to be applied only in ways that are consistent with those mainstream fiduciary duties.

SRI, which refers to a spectrum of investment strategies that seek to integrate ethical, moral, sustainability and other non-financial factors into the investment process, generally involves exclusion and/or divestment, as well as investment guidelines that restrict investments. AllianceBernstein may accept such guideline restrictions upon client request.

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2. Approach to ESG

Our long-standing policy has been to include ESG factors in our extensive fundamental research and consider them carefully when we believe they are material to our forecasts and investment decisions. If we determine that these aspects of an issuer's past, current or anticipated behavior are material to its future expected returns, we address these concerns in our forecasts, research reviews, investment decisions and engagement. In addition, we have well-developed proxy voting policies that incorporate ESG issues and engagement.

3. Commitment to the PRI

In recent years, we have gained greater clarity on how the PRI initiative, based on information from PRI Advisory Council members and from other signatories, provides a framework for incorporating ESG factors into investment research and decision-making. Furthermore, our industry has become, over time, more aware of the importance of ESG factors. We acknowledge these developments and seek to refine what has been our process in this area.

After careful consideration, we determined that becoming a PRI signatory would enhance our current ESG practices and align with our fiduciary duties to our clients as a mainstream investment manager. Accordingly, we became a signatory, effective November 1, 2011.

In signing the PRI, AllianceBernstein as an investment manager publicly commits to adopt and implement all six Principles, where consistent with our fiduciary responsibilities, and to make progress over time on implementation of the Principles.

The six Principles are:

1. We will incorporate ESG issues into investment research and decision-making processes.

AllianceBernstein Examples: ESG issues are included in the research analysis process. In some cases, external service providers of ESG-related tools are utilized; we have conducted proxy voting training and will have continued and expanded training for investment professionals to incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes across our firm.

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2. We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and practices.

AllianceBernstein Examples: We are active owners through our proxy voting process (for additional information, please refer to our *Statement of Policies and Procedures for Proxy Voting Manual*); we engage issuers on ESG matters in our investment research process (we define “engagement” as discussions with management about ESG issues when they are, or we believe they are reasonably likely to become, material).

3. We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest.

AllianceBernstein Examples: Generally, we support transparency regarding ESG issues when we conclude the disclosure is reasonable. Similarly, in proxy voting, we will support shareholder initiatives and resolutions promoting ESG disclosure when we conclude the disclosure is reasonable.

4. We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment industry.

AllianceBernstein Examples: By signing the PRI, we have taken an important first step in promoting acceptance and implementation of the six Principles within our industry.

5. We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles.

AllianceBernstein Examples: We will engage with clients and participate in forums with other PRI signatories to better understand how the PRI are applied in our respective businesses. As a PRI signatory, we have access to information, tools and other signatories to help ensure that we are effective in our endeavors to implement the PRI.

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6. We will report on our activities and progress towards implementing the Principles.

AllianceBernstein Examples: We will respond to the 2012 PRI questionnaire and disclose PRI scores from the questionnaire in response to inquiries from clients and in requests for proposals; we will provide examples as requested concerning active ownership activities (voting, engagement or policy dialogue).

4. RI Committee

Our firm's RI Committee provides AllianceBernstein stakeholders, including employees, clients, prospects, consultants and service providers alike, with a resource within our firm on which they can rely for information regarding our approach to ESG issues and how those issues are incorporated in different ways by the PRI and SRI. Additionally, the RI Committee is responsible for assisting AllianceBernstein personnel to further implement our firm's RI policies and practices, and, over time, to make progress on implementing all six Principles.

The RI Committee has a diverse membership, including senior representatives from investments, distribution/sales and legal. The Committee is chaired by John Phillips, a Senior Portfolio Manager in Value Equities and the Chairman of the Proxy Voting Committee for Bernstein.

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If you have questions or desire additional information about this Policy, we encourage you to contact the RI Committee at RIinquiries@alliancebernstein.com or reach out to a Committee member:

Erin Bigley: SVP-Fixed Income, New York
Alex Chaloff: SVP-Private Client, Los Angeles
Steve Cheetham: SVP-Value, London
James Crawford: SVP-Value, Australia
Kathy Fisher: SVP-Private Client, New York
Linda Giuliano: SVP-Equities, New York
David Lesser: VP-Legal, New York
Jason Ley: SVP-Growth, Chicago
Mark Manley: SVP-Legal, New York
Takuji Oya: VP-Growth, Japan
John Phillips: SVP-Value, New York
Guy Prochilo: SVP-Institutional Investments, New York
Liz Smith: SVP-Institutional Investments, New York
Chris Toub: SVP-Equities, New York
Willem Van Gijzen: VP-Institutional Investments, Netherlands