

This attachment contains the two most recent Senior Officer Fee Summaries for the Fund.

THE FOLLOWING IS NOT PART OF THE SHAREHOLDER REPORT OR THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

SUMMARY OF SENIOR OFFICER'S EVALUATION OF
INVESTMENT ADVISORY AGREEMENT¹

The following is a summary of the evaluation of the Investment Advisory Agreement between AllianceBernstein L.P. (the "Adviser") and Sanford C. Bernstein Fund II, Inc. – Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio (the "Fund"),² prepared by Philip L. Kirstein, the Senior Officer of the Fund, for the Directors of the Fund, as required by the August 2004 agreement between the Adviser and the New York State Attorney General (the "NYAG"). The Senior Officer's evaluation of the Investment Advisory Agreement is not meant to diminish the responsibility or authority of the Board of Directors to perform its duties pursuant to Section 15 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "40 Act") and applicable state law. The purpose of this summary is to provide shareholders with a synopsis of the independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the advisory fees proposed to be paid by the Fund which was provided to the Directors in connection with their review of the proposed approval of the continuance of the Investment Advisory Agreement.

The Senior Officer's evaluation considered the following factors:

1. Advisory fees charged to institutional and other clients of the Adviser for like services;
2. Advisory fees charged by other mutual fund companies for like services;

¹ The information in the fee evaluation was completed on October 20, 2016 and discussed with the Board of Directors on November 1-3, 2016.

² Future references to the Fund do not include "Sanford C. Bernstein Fund II, Inc."

3. Costs to the Adviser and its affiliates of supplying services pursuant to the advisory agreement, excluding any intra-corporate profit;
4. Profit margins of the Adviser and its affiliates from supplying such services;
5. Possible economies of scale as the Fund grows larger; and
6. Nature and quality of the Adviser's services including the performance of the Fund.

These factors, with the exception of the first factor, are generally referred to as the “*Gartenberg* factors,” which were articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1982. *Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.*, 694 F. 2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). On March 30, 2010, the Supreme Court held the *Gartenberg* decision was correct in its basic formulation of what Section 36(b) requires: to face liability under Section 36(b), “an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s length bargaining.” *Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.*, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010). In *Jones*, the Court stated the *Gartenberg* approach fully incorporates the correct understanding of fiduciary duty within the context of Section 36(b) and noted with approval that “*Gartenberg* insists that all relevant circumstances be taken into account” and “uses the range of fees that might result from arm’s length bargaining as the benchmark for reviewing challenged fees.”³

³ *Jones v. Harris* at 1427.

INVESTMENT ADVISORY FEES, NET ASSETS, EXPENSE CAP & RATIOS

The Adviser proposed that the Fund pays the advisory fee set forth in the table below for receiving the services to be provided pursuant to the Investment Advisory Agreement.⁴ Also shown are the Fund's net assets on September 30, 2016.

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Advisory Fee Based on % of Average Daily Net Assets</u>	<u>Net Assets 09/30/16 (\$MM)</u>
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio ⁵	0.50% on 1 st 1 billion 0.45% on the balance	\$634.6

The Adviser is reimbursed as specified in the Investment Advisory Agreement for certain clerical, legal, accounting, administrative and other services provided to the Fund. During the Fund's most recently completed fiscal year, the Adviser received \$54,217 (0.009% of the Fund's average daily net assets) for such services.

The Adviser has agreed to waive that portion of its advisory fees and/or reimburse the Fund for that portion of the Fund's total operating expenses to the degree necessary to limit the Fund's expense ratio to the amount set forth below for the Fund's current fiscal year. The waiver is terminable by the Adviser upon at least 60 days' notice prior to the Fund's prospectus update. In addition, set forth below is the gross expense ratio of the Fund, annualized for the most recent semi-annual period:⁶

⁴ Most of the AB Mutual Funds, which the Adviser manages, were affected by the Adviser's settlement with the NYAG. The Fund was not affected by the Adviser's agreement with the NYAG since the Fund's fee schedule already had lower breakpoints than the NYAG regulated fee schedule for AB Mutual Funds with a category of "High Income."

⁵ The Fund has an expense cap of 0.45%, which effectively reduces the advisory fee.

⁶ Semi-annual total expense ratios are unaudited.

<u>Fund</u>	Expense Cap Pursuant to Expense Limitation <u>Undertaking</u>	Gross Expense Ratio <u>(3/31/16)</u>	<u>Fiscal Year End</u>
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	0.45%	0.59%	September 30 (ratio as of Mar. 31, 2016)

I. ADVISORY FEES CHARGED TO INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CLIENTS

The advisory fees charged to investment companies which the Adviser manages and sponsors are normally higher than those charged to similar sized institutional accounts, including pension plans and sub-advised investment companies. The fee differential reflects, among other things, different services provided to such clients, and different liabilities assumed. Services provided by the Adviser to the Fund that are not provided to non-investment company clients and sub-advised investment companies include providing office space and personnel to serve as Fund Officers, who among other responsibilities make the certifications required under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and coordinating with and monitoring the Fund’ third party service providers such as Fund counsel, auditors, custodians, transfer agents and pricing services. The accounting, administrative, legal and compliance requirements for the Fund are more costly than those for institutional assets due to the greater complexities and time required for investment companies, although as previously noted, the Adviser is reimbursed for providing some of these services. The Adviser also believes that it incurs substantial entrepreneurial risk when offering a new mutual fund since establishing a new mutual fund requires a large upfront investment and it may take a long time for the fund to achieve profitability since the fund must be priced to scale from inception in order to be

competitive and assets are acquired one account at a time. In addition, managing the cash flow of an investment company may be more difficult than managing that of a stable pool of assets, such as an institutional account with little cash movement in either direction, particularly, if a fund is in net redemption and the Adviser is frequently forced to sell securities to raise cash for redemptions. However, managing a fund with positive cash flow may be easier at times than managing a stable pool of assets. Finally, in recent years, investment advisers have been sued by institutional clients and have suffered reputational damage both by the attendant publicity and outcomes other than complete victories. Accordingly, the legal and reputational risks associated with institutional accounts are greater than previously thought, although still not equal to those related to the mutual fund industry.

Notwithstanding the Adviser's view that managing an investment company is not comparable to managing other institutional accounts because the services provided are different, the Supreme Court has indicated consideration should be given to the advisory fees charged to institutional accounts with a similar investment style as the Fund.⁷ In addition to the AB Institutional fee schedule, set forth below is what would have been the effective advisory fee of the Fund had the AB Institutional fee schedule been applicable to the Fund versus the Fund's advisory fee based on September 30, 2016 net assets:⁸

⁷ The Supreme Court stated that "courts may give such comparisons the weight that they merit in light of the similarities and differences between the services that the clients in question require, but the courts must be wary of inapt comparisons." Among the significant differences the Supreme Court noted that may exist between services provided to mutual funds and institutional accounts are "higher marketing costs." *Jones v. Harris* at 1428.

⁸ The Adviser has indicated that with respect to institutional accounts with assets greater than \$300 million, it will negotiate a fee schedule. Discounts that are negotiated vary based upon each client relationship.

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Net Assets 9/30/16 (\$MM)</u>	<u>AB Institutional Fee Schedule</u>	<u>Effective AB Inst. Adv. Fee (%)</u>	<u>Fund Advisory Fee (%)</u>
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	\$634.6	U.S. Strategic Core Plus 0.50% on 1 st \$30 million 0.20% on the balance <i>Minimum Account Size: \$25m</i>	0.214%	0.500%

The Adviser manages Sanford C. Bernstein Fund, Inc. (“SCB Fund”), an open-end management investment company. The Intermediate Duration Portfolio of SCB Fund has a similar investment style as the Fund, and its advisory fee schedule is shown below. In addition, set forth is what would have been the effective fee for the Fund had the advisory fee schedule of Intermediate Duration Portfolio been applicable to the Fund versus the Fund’s advisory fee based on September 30, 2016 net assets:

<u>Fund</u>	<u>SCB Fund Portfolio</u>	<u>Fee Schedule</u>	<u>SCB Fund Effective Fee (%)</u>	<u>Fund Advisory Fee (%)</u>
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	Intermediate Duration Portfolio	0.50% on 1 st \$1 billion 0.45% on next \$2 billion 0.40% on next \$2 billion 0.35% on next \$2 billion 0.30% thereafter	0.500%	0.500% ⁹

The AB Variable Products Series Fund, Inc. (“AVPS”), which is managed by the Adviser and is available through variable annuity and variable life contracts offered by other financial institutions, offers policyholders the option to utilize certain AVPS portfolios as the investment option underlying their insurance contracts. The AVPS Intermediate Bond Portfolio has a similar investment style as the Fund, and its advisory

⁹ The Fund has an expense cap 0.45% which effectively reduces the advisory fees by at least five basis points.

fee schedule is set forth below.¹⁰ Also shown is what would have been the effective advisory fee of the Fund had the AVPS fee schedule been applicable to the Fund versus the Fund’s advisory fee based on September 30, 2016 net assets.

<u>Fund</u>	<u>AVPS Portfolio</u>	<u>Fee Schedule</u>	<u>AVPS Effective Fee (%)</u>	<u>Fund Advisory Fee (%)</u>
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	Intermediate Bond Portfolio	0.45% on first \$2.5 billion 0.40% on next \$2.5 billion 0.35% on the balance	0.450%	0.500% ⁹

The Adviser represented that it does not provide any sub-advisory investment services to other investment companies that have a substantially similar investment style as the Fund.

II. MANAGEMENT FEES CHARGED BY OTHER MUTUAL FUND COMPANIES FOR LIKE SERVICES.

Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (“Broadridge”), an analytical service that is not affiliated with the Adviser, compared the fees charged to the Fund with fees charged to other investment companies for similar services offered by other investment advisers.^{11,12} Broadridge’s analysis included the comparison of the Fund’s contractual management fee, estimated at the approximate current asset level of the Fund, to the

¹⁰ AVPS was also affected by the settlement between the Adviser and the NYAG.

¹¹ The Supreme Court cautioned against accepting mutual fund fee comparisons without careful scrutiny since “these comparisons are problematic because these fees, like those challenged, may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm’s length.” *Jones v. Harris* at 1429.

¹² On June 5, 2015, Broadridge acquired the Fiduciary Services and Competitive Intelligence unit, *i.e.*, the group responsible for providing the Fund’s 15(c) reports, from Thomson Reuters’ Lipper division. The group that maintains Lipper’s expense and performance databases and investment classification/objective remains a part of Thomson Reuters’ Lipper division. Accordingly, the Fund’s investment classification/objective continued to be determined by Lipper.

median of the Fund’s Broadridge Expense Group (“EG”)¹³ and the Fund’s contractual management fee ranking.¹⁴

Broadridge describes an EG as a representative sample of comparable funds. Broadridge’s standard methodology for screening funds to be included in an EG entails the consideration of several fund criteria, including fund type, Lipper investment classification/objective, load type and similar 12b-1/non-12b-1 service fees, asset (size) comparability, expense components and attributes. An EG will typically consist of seven to twenty funds.

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Contractual Management Fee (%)</u> ¹⁵	<u>Broadridge EG Median (%)</u>	<u>Broadridge Group Rank</u>
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	0.500	0.468	12/16

Broadridge also compared the Fund’s total expense ratio to the medians of the Fund’s EG and Broadridge Expense Universe (“EU”). The EU is a broader group compared to the EG, consisting of all funds that have the same investment classifications/objective and load type as the subject Fund.¹⁶

¹³ Broadridge does not consider average account size when constructing EGs. Funds with relatively small average account sizes tend to have higher transfer agent expense ratios than comparable sized funds that have relatively large average account sizes. Note that there are limitations on Lipper expense category data because different funds categorize expenses differently.

¹⁴ The contractual management fee is calculated by Broadridge using the Fund’s contractual management fee rate at the hypothetical asset level. The hypothetical asset level is based on the combined net assets of all classes of the Fund, rounded up to the next \$25 million. Broadridge’s total expense ratio information is based on the most recent annual report except as otherwise noted. A ranking of “1” would mean that the Fund had the lowest effective fee rate in the Broadridge peer group.

¹⁵ The contractual management fee does not reflect any expense reimbursements made by the Fund to the Adviser for certain clerical, legal, accounting, administrative, and other services. In addition, the contractual management fee does not reflect any advisory fee waivers or expense reimbursements made by the Adviser that would effectively reduce the actual effective management fee.

¹⁶ Except for asset (size) comparability, Broadridge uses the same criteria for selecting an EG when selecting an EU. Unlike the EG, the EU allows for the same adviser to be represented by more than just one fund.

<u>Fund</u>	Total Expense Ratio (%)	Broadridge EG Median (%)	Broadridge EG Rank	Broadridge EU Median (%)	Broadridge Universe Rank
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	0.450	0.467	6/16	0.514	24/86

Based on this analysis, the Fund has a more favorable ranking on a total expense ratio basis than on a contractual management fee basis.

III. COSTS TO THE ADVISER AND ITS AFFILIATES OF SUPPLYING SERVICES PURSUANT TO THE MANAGEMENT FEE ARRANGEMENT, EXCLUDING ANY INTRA-CORPORATE PROFIT.

The Adviser utilizes two profitability reporting systems, which operate independently but are aligned with each other, to estimate the Adviser's profitability in connection with investment advisory services provided to the Fund. The Senior Officer has retained a consultant to provide independent advice regarding the alignment of the two profitability systems as well as the methodologies and allocations utilized by both profitability systems. See Section IV for additional discussion.

IV. PROFIT MARGINS OF THE ADVISER AND ITS AFFILIATES FOR SUPPLYING SUCH SERVICES

The Fund's profitability information, prepared by the Adviser for the Board of Directors, was reviewed by the Senior Officer and the consultant. The Adviser's profitability from providing investment advisory services to the Fund decreased during the calendar year 2015, relative to 2014.

V. POSSIBLE ECONOMIES OF SCALE

The Adviser has indicated that economies of scale are being shared with shareholders through pricing to scale, breakpoints, fee reductions/waivers and enhancement to services.

In May 2012, an independent consultant, retained by the Senior Officer, provided the Board of Directors information on the Adviser's firm-wide average costs from 2005 through 2011 and the potential economies of scale. The independent consultant noted that from 2005 through 2007 the Adviser experienced significant growth in assets under management ("AUM"). During this period, operating expenses increased, in part to keep up with growth, and in part reflecting market returns. However, from 2008 through the first quarter of 2009, AUM rapidly and significantly decreased due to declines in market value and client withdrawals. When AUM rapidly decreased, some operating expenses categories, including base compensation and office space, adjusted more slowly during this period, resulting in an increase in average costs. Since 2009, AUM has experienced less significant changes. The independent consultant noted that changes in operating expenses reflect changes in business composition and business practices in response to changes in financial markets. Finally, the independent consultant concluded that the increase in average cost and the decline in net operating margin across the Adviser since late 2008 are inconsistent with the view that there are currently reductions in average costs due to economies of scale that can be shared with the AB Mutual Funds managed by the Adviser through lower fees.

Previously, in February 2008, the independent consultant provided the Board of Directors an update of the Deli¹⁷ study on advisory fees and various fund characteristics.¹⁸ The independent consultant first reiterated the results of his previous

¹⁷ The Deli study, originally published in 2002 based on 1997 data and updated for the February 2008 Presentation, may be of diminished value due to the age of the data used in the presentation and the changes experienced in the industry over the last four years. Source: Deli, Daniel N. "Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation." *Journal of Finance*, 57(1): 109-133 (2002).

¹⁸ As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court cautioned against accepting mutual fund fee comparisons without careful scrutiny since the fees may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm's length. See *Jones V. Harris* at 1429.

two dimensional comparison analysis (fund size and family size) with the Board of Directors.¹⁹ The independent consultant then discussed the results of the regression model that was utilized to study the effects of various factors on advisory fees. The regression model output indicated that the bulk of the variation in fees predicted were explained by various factors, but substantially by fund AUM, family AUM, index fund indicator and investment style. The independent consultant also compared the advisory fees of the AB Mutual Funds to similar funds managed by 19 other large asset managers, regardless of the fund size and each Adviser's proportion of mutual fund assets to non-mutual fund assets.

VI. NATURE AND QUALITY OF THE ADVISER'S SERVICES, INCLUDING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FUND

With assets under management of approximately \$490 billion as of September 30, 2016, the Adviser has the investment experience to manage and provide non-investment services (described in Section I) to the Fund.

The information prepared by Lipper Broadridge shows the 1, 3, 5 and 10 year performance returns and rankings²⁰ of the Fund relative to its Broadridge Performance Group ("PG") and Broadridge Performance Universe ("PU")²¹ for the period ended July 31, 2016.²²

¹⁹ The two dimensional analysis showed patterns of lower advisory fees for funds with larger asset sizes and funds from larger family sizes compared to funds with smaller asset sizes and funds from smaller family sizes, which according to the independent consultant is indicative of a sharing of economies of scale and scope. However, in less liquid and active markets, such is not the case, as the empirical analysis showed potential for diseconomies of scale in those markets. The empirical analysis also showed diminishing economies of scale and scope as funds surpassed a certain high level of assets.

²⁰ Fund performance returns were provided by Broadridge.

²¹ The Fund's PG is identical to the Fund's EG. The Fund's PU is not identical to the Fund's EU as the criteria for including/excluding a fund from a PG/PU is somewhat different from that of an EG/EU.

²² The current Lipper investment classification/objective dictates the PG and PU throughout the life of the Fund even if the Fund had a different investment classification/objective at a different point in time.

	Fund Return (%)	PG Median (%)	PU Median (%)	PG Rank	PU Rank
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio					
1 year	6.65	5.60	5.50	2/16	6/82
3 year	4.86	4.19	4.14	2/14	7/72
5 year	3.88	3.79	3.82	2/13	23/65
10 year	5.40	5.36	5.21	4/10	16/50

Set forth below are the 1, 3, 5, 10 year and since inception performance returns of the Fund (in bold) versus its benchmark.²³ Fund and benchmark volatility and reward-to-variability ratio (“Sharpe Ratio”) information is also shown.²⁴

Period Ended July 31, 2016
Annualized Net Performance (%)

	1 Year (%)	3 Year (%)	5 Year (%)	10 Year (%)	Since Inception (%)	Annualized Volatility (%)	Annualized Sharpe (%)	Risk Period (Year)
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	6.66	4.86	3.89	5.40	5.17	4.05	1.05	10
Bloomberg Barclays Capital U.S Aggregate Bond Index	5.94	4.23	3.57	5.06	4.94	3.20	1.24	10

Inception Date: May 17, 2002

CONCLUSION:

Based on the factors discussed above the Senior Officer’s conclusion is that the proposed advisory fee for the Fund is reasonable and within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s length in light of all the surrounding circumstances. This

²³ The Adviser provided Fund and benchmark performance return information for periods through July 31, 2016.

²⁴ Fund and benchmark volatility and Sharpe Ratio information was obtained through Lipper LANA, a database maintained by Lipper. Volatility is a statistical measure of the tendency of a market price or yield to vary over time. A Sharpe Ratio is a risk adjusted measure of return that divides a fund’s return in excess of the riskless return by the fund’s standard deviation. A fund with a greater volatility would be viewed as more risky than a fund with equivalent performance but lower volatility; for that reason, a greater return would be demanded for the more risky fund. A fund with a higher Sharpe Ratio would be viewed as better performing than a fund with a lower Sharpe Ratio.

conclusion in respect of the Fund is based on an evaluation of all of these factors and no single factor was dispositive.

Dated: November 18, 2016

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.

THE FOLLOWING IS NOT PART OF THE SHAREHOLDER REPORT OR THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

SUMMARY OF SENIOR OFFICER'S EVALUATION OF
INVESTMENT ADVISORY AGREEMENT¹

The following is a summary of the evaluation of the Investment Advisory Agreement between AllianceBernstein L.P. (the "Adviser") and Sanford C. Bernstein Fund II, Inc. – Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio (the "Fund"),² prepared by Philip L. Kirstein, the Senior Officer of the Fund, for the Directors of the Fund, as required by the August 2004 agreement between the Adviser and the New York State Attorney General (the "NYAG"). The Senior Officer's evaluation of the Investment Advisory Agreement is not meant to diminish the responsibility or authority of the Board of Directors to perform its duties pursuant to Section 15 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "40 Act") and applicable state law. The purpose of this summary is to provide shareholders with a synopsis of the independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the advisory fees proposed to be paid by the Fund which was provided to the Directors in connection with their review of the proposed approval of the continuance of the Investment Advisory Agreement.

The Senior Officer's evaluation considered the following factors:

1. Advisory fees charged to institutional and other clients of the Adviser for like services;
2. Advisory fees charged by other mutual fund companies for like services;

¹ The information in the fee evaluation was completed on October 22, 2015 and discussed with the Board of Directors on November 3-5, 2015.

² Future references to the Fund do not include "Sanford C. Bernstein Fund II, Inc."

3. Costs to the Adviser and its affiliates of supplying services pursuant to the advisory agreement, excluding any intra-corporate profit;
4. Profit margins of the Adviser and its affiliates from supplying such services;
5. Possible economies of scale as the Fund grows larger; and
6. Nature and quality of the Adviser's services including the performance of the Fund.

These factors, with the exception of the first factor, are generally referred to as the “*Gartenberg* factors,” which were articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1982. *Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.*, 694 F. 2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). On March 30, 2010, the Supreme Court held the *Gartenberg* decision was correct in its basic formulation of what Section 36(b) requires: to face liability under Section 36(b), “an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s length bargaining.” *Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.*, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010). In *Jones*, the Court stated the *Gartenberg* approach fully incorporates the correct understanding of fiduciary duty within the context of Section 36(b) and noted with approval that “*Gartenberg* insists that all relevant circumstances be taken into account” and “uses the range of fees that might result from arm’s length bargaining as the benchmark for reviewing challenged fees.”³

³ *Jones v. Harris* at 1427.

INVESTMENT ADVISORY FEES, NET ASSETS, EXPENSE CAP & RATIOS

The Adviser proposed that the Fund pays the advisory fee set forth in the table below for receiving the services to be provided pursuant to the Investment Advisory Agreement.⁴ Also shown are the Fund's net assets on September 30, 2015.

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Advisory Fee Based on % of Average Daily Net Assets</u>	<u>Net Assets 09/30/15 (\$MM)</u>
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio ⁵	0.50% on 1 st 1 billion 0.45% on the balance	\$615.4

The Adviser has agreed to waive that portion of its advisory fees and/or reimburse the Fund for that portion of the Fund's total operating expenses to the degree necessary to limit the Fund's expense ratio to the amount set forth below for the Fund's current fiscal year. The waiver is terminable by the Adviser upon at least 60 days' notice prior to the Fund's prospectus update. In addition, set forth below is the gross expense ratio of the Fund, annualized for the most recent semi-annual period:⁶

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Expense Cap Pursuant to Expense Limitation Undertaking</u>	<u>Gross Expense Ratio (3/31/15)⁷</u>	<u>Fiscal Year End</u>
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	0.45%	0.59%	September 30

⁴ Most of the AB Mutual Funds, which the Adviser manages, were affected by the Adviser's settlement with the NYAG. The Fund was not affected by the Adviser's agreement with the NYAG since the Fund's fee schedule already had lower breakpoints than the NYAG regulated fee schedule for AB Mutual Funds with a category of "High Income."

⁵ The Fund has an expense cap of 0.45%, which effectively reduces the advisory fee.

⁶ Semi-annual total expense ratios are unaudited.

⁷ Annualized.

I. ADVISORY FEES CHARGED TO INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CLIENTS

The advisory fees charged to investment companies which the Adviser manages and sponsors are normally higher than those charged to similar sized institutional accounts, including pension plans and sub-advised investment companies. The fee differential reflects, among other things, different services provided to such clients, and different liabilities assumed. Services provided by the Adviser to the Fund that are not provided to non-investment company clients and sub-advised investment companies include providing office space and personnel to serve as Fund Officers, who among other responsibilities make the certifications required under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and coordinating with and monitoring the Fund’ third party service providers such as Fund counsel, auditors, custodians, transfer agents and pricing services. The accounting, administrative, legal and compliance requirements for the Fund are more costly than those for institutional assets due to the greater complexities and time required for investment companies. The Adviser also believes that it incurs substantial entrepreneurial risk when offering a new mutual fund since establishing a new mutual fund requires a large upfront investment and it may take a long time for the fund to achieve profitability since the fund must be priced to scale from inception in order to be competitive and assets are acquired one account at a time. In addition, managing the cash flow of an investment company may be more difficult than managing that of a stable pool of assets, such as an institutional account with little cash movement in either direction, particularly, if a fund is in net redemption and the Adviser is frequently forced to sell securities to raise cash for redemptions. However, managing a fund with positive cash flow may be easier at times than managing a stable pool of assets. Finally, in recent

years, investment advisers have been sued by institutional clients and have suffered reputational damage both by the attendant publicity and outcomes other than complete victories. Accordingly, the legal and reputational risks associated with institutional accounts are greater than previously thought, although still not equal to those related to the mutual fund industry.

Notwithstanding the Adviser’s view that managing an investment company is not comparable to managing other institutional accounts because the services provided are different, the Supreme Court has indicated consideration should be given to the advisory fees charged to institutional accounts with a similar investment style as the Fund.⁸ In addition to the AB Institutional fee schedule, set forth below is what would have been the effective advisory fee of the Fund had the AB Institutional fee schedule been applicable to the Fund versus the Fund’s advisory fee based on September 30, 2015 net assets:⁹

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Net Assets 9/30/15 (\$MM)</u>	<u>AB Institutional Fee Schedule</u>	<u>Effective AB Inst. Adv. Fee (%)</u>	<u>Fund Advisory Fee (%)</u>
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	\$615.4	U.S. Strategic Core Plus 0.50% on 1 st \$30 million 0.20% on the balance <i>Minimum Account Size: \$25m</i>	0.215%	0.500%

The Adviser manages Sanford C. Bernstein Fund, Inc. (“SCB Fund”), an open-end management investment company. The Intermediate Duration Portfolio of SCB Fund has a similar investment style as the Fund, and its advisory fee schedule is shown

⁸ The Supreme Court stated that “courts may give such comparisons the weight that they merit in light of the similarities and differences between the services that the clients in question require, but the courts must be wary of inapt comparisons.” Among the significant differences the Supreme Court noted that may exist between services provided to mutual funds and institutional accounts are “higher marketing costs.” *Jones v. Harris* at 1428.

⁹ The Adviser has indicated that with respect to institutional accounts with assets greater than \$300 million, it will negotiate a fee schedule. Discounts that are negotiated vary based upon each client relationship.

below. In addition, set forth is what would have been the effective fee for the Fund had the advisory fee schedule of Intermediate Duration Portfolio been applicable to the Fund versus the Fund's advisory fee based on September 30, 2015 net assets:

<u>Fund</u>	<u>SCB Fund Portfolio</u>	<u>Fee Schedule</u>	<u>SCB Fund Effective Fee (%)</u>	<u>Fund Advisory Fee (%)</u>
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	Intermediate Duration Portfolio	0.50% on 1 st \$1 billion 0.45% on next \$2 billion 0.40% on next \$2 billion 0.35% on next \$2 billion 0.30% thereafter	0.500%	0.500% ¹⁰

The AB Variable Products Series Fund, Inc. ("AVPS"), which is managed by the Adviser and is available through variable annuity and variable life contracts offered by other financial institutions, offers policyholders the option to utilize certain AVPS portfolios as the investment option underlying their insurance contracts. The AVPS Intermediate Bond Portfolio has a similar investment style as the Fund, and its advisory fee schedule is set forth below.¹¹ Also shown is what would have been the effective advisory fee of the Fund had the AVPS fee schedule been applicable to the Fund versus the Fund's advisory fee based on September 30, 2015 net assets.

<u>Fund</u>	<u>AVPS Portfolio</u>	<u>Fee Schedule</u>	<u>AVPS Effective Fee (%)</u>	<u>Fund Advisory Fee (%)</u>
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	Intermediate Bond Portfolio	0.45% on first \$2.5 billion 0.40% on next \$2.5 billion 0.35% on the balance	0.450%	0.500% ¹⁰

¹⁰ The Fund has an expense cap 0.45% which effectively reduces the advisory fees by at least five basis points.

¹¹ AVPS was also affected by the settlement between the Adviser and the NYAG.

The Adviser represented that it does not provide any sub-advisory investment services to other investment companies that have a substantially similar investment style as the Fund.

II. MANAGEMENT FEES CHARGED BY OTHER MUTUAL FUND COMPANIES FOR LIKE SERVICES.

Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (“Broadridge”), an analytical service that is not affiliated with the Adviser, compared the fees charged to the Fund with fees charged to other investment companies for similar services offered by other investment advisers.^{12,13} Broadridge’s analysis included the comparison of the Fund’s contractual management fee, estimated at the approximate current asset level of the Fund, to the median of the Fund’s Broadridge Expense Group (“EG”)¹⁴ and the Fund’s contractual management fee ranking.¹⁵

Broadridge describes an EG as a representative sample of comparable funds. Broadridge’s standard methodology for screening funds to be included in an EG entails the consideration of several fund criteria, including fund type, Lipper investment classification/objective, load type and similar 12b-1/non-12b-1 service fees, asset (size)

¹² The Supreme Court cautioned against accepting mutual fund fee comparisons without careful scrutiny since “these comparisons are problematic because these fees, like those challenged, may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm’s length.” *Jones v. Harris* at 1429.

¹³ On June 5, 2015, Broadridge acquired the Fiduciary Services and Competitive Intelligence unit, *i.e.*, the group responsible for providing the Fund’s 15(c) reports, from Thomson Reuters’ Lipper division. The group that maintains Lipper’s expense and performance databases and investment classification/objective remains a part of Thomson Reuters’ Lipper division. Accordingly, the Fund’s investment classification/objective continued to be determined by Lipper.

¹⁴ Broadridge does not consider average account size when constructing EGs. Funds with relatively small average account sizes tend to have higher transfer agent expense ratios than comparable sized funds that have relatively large average account sizes. Note that there are limitations on Lipper expense category data because different funds categorize expenses differently.

¹⁵ The contractual management fee is calculated by Broadridge using the Fund’s contractual management fee rate at the hypothetical asset level. The hypothetical asset level is based on the combined net assets of all classes of the Fund, rounded up to the next \$25 million. Broadridge’s total expense ratio information is based on the most recent annual report except as otherwise noted. A ranking of “1” would mean that the Fund had the lowest effective fee rate in the Broadridge peer group.

comparability, expense components and attributes. An EG will typically consist of seven to twenty funds.

<u>Fund</u>	Contractual Management Fee (%) ¹⁶	Broadridge EG Median (%)	Broadridge Group Rank
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	0.500	0.499	10/17

Broadridge also compared the Fund’s total expense ratio to the medians of the Fund’s EG and Broadridge Expense Universe (“EU”). The EU is a broader group compared to the EG, consisting of all funds that have the same investment classifications/objective and load type as the subject Fund.¹⁷

<u>Fund</u>	Total Expense Ratio (%)	Broadridge EG Median (%)	Broadridge EG Rank	Broadridge EU Median (%)	Broadridge Universe Rank
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	0.450	0.530	3/17	0.510	21/69

Based on this analysis, the Fund has a more favorable ranking on a total expense ratio basis than on a contractual management fee basis.

III. COSTS TO THE ADVISER AND ITS AFFILIATES OF SUPPLYING SERVICES PURSUANT TO THE MANAGEMENT FEE ARRANGEMENT, EXCLUDING ANY INTRA-CORPORATE PROFIT.

The Adviser utilizes two profitability reporting systems, which operate independently but are aligned with each other, to estimate the Adviser’s profitability in connection with investment advisory services provided to the Fund. The Senior Officer

¹⁶ The contractual management fee does not reflect any expense reimbursements made by the Fund to the Adviser for certain clerical, legal, accounting, administrative, and other services. In addition, the contractual management fee does not reflect any advisory fee waivers or expense reimbursements made by the Adviser that would effectively reduce the actual effective management fee.

¹⁷ Except for asset (size) comparability, Broadridge uses the same criteria for selecting an EG when selecting an EU. Unlike the EG, the EU allows for the same adviser to be represented by more than just one fund.

has retained a consultant to provide independent advice regarding the alignment of the two profitability systems as well as the methodologies and allocations utilized by both profitability systems. See Section IV for additional discussion.

IV. PROFIT MARGINS OF THE ADVISER AND ITS AFFILIATES FOR SUPPLYING SUCH SERVICES

The Fund' profitability information, prepared by the Adviser for the Board of Directors, was reviewed by the Senior Officer and the consultant. The Adviser's profitability from providing investment advisory services to the Fund decreased during the calendar year 2014, relative to 2013.

V. POSSIBLE ECONOMIES OF SCALE

The Adviser has indicated that economies of scale are being shared with shareholders through pricing to scale, breakpoints, fee reductions/waivers and enhancement to services.

In May 2012, an independent consultant, retained by the Senior Officer, provided the Board of Directors information on the Adviser's firm-wide average costs from 2005 through 2011 and the potential economies of scale. The independent consultant noted that from 2005 through 2007 the Adviser experienced significant growth in assets under management ("AUM"). During this period, operating expenses increased, in part to keep up with growth, and in part reflecting market returns. However, from 2008 through the first quarter of 2009, AUM rapidly and significantly decreased due to declines in market value and client withdrawals. When AUM rapidly decreased, some operating expenses categories, including base compensation and office space, adjusted more slowly during this period, resulting in an increase in average costs. Since 2009, AUM has experienced less significant changes. The independent consultant noted that changes in operating

expenses reflect changes in business composition and business practices in response to changes in financial markets. Finally, the independent consultant concluded that the increase in average cost and the decline in net operating margin across the Adviser since late 2008 are inconsistent with the view that there are currently reductions in average costs due to economies of scale that can be shared with the AB Mutual Funds managed by the Adviser through lower fees.

Previously, in February 2008, the independent consultant provided the Board of Directors an update of the Deli¹⁸ study on advisory fees and various fund characteristics.¹⁹ The independent consultant first reiterated the results of his previous two dimensional comparison analysis (fund size and family size) with the Board of Directors.²⁰ The independent consultant then discussed the results of the regression model that was utilized to study the effects of various factors on advisory fees. The regression model output indicated that the bulk of the variation in fees predicted were explained by various factors, but substantially by fund AUM, family AUM, index fund indicator and investment style. The independent consultant also compared the advisory fees of the AB Mutual Funds to similar funds managed by 19 other large asset managers, regardless of the fund size and each Adviser's proportion of mutual fund assets to non-mutual fund assets.

¹⁸ The Deli study, originally published in 2002 based on 1997 data and updated for the February 2008 Presentation, may be of diminished value due to the age of the data used in the presentation and the changes experienced in the industry since 2008.

¹⁹ As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court cautioned against accepting mutual fund fee comparisons without careful scrutiny since the fees may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm's length. See *Jones V. Harris* at 1429.

²⁰ The two dimensional analysis showed patterns of lower advisory fees for funds with larger asset sizes and funds from larger family sizes compared to funds with smaller asset sizes and funds from smaller family sizes, which according to the independent consultant is indicative of a sharing of economies of scale and scope. However, in less liquid and active markets, such is not the case, as the empirical analysis showed potential for diseconomies of scale in those markets. The empirical analysis also showed diminishing economies of scale and scope as funds surpassed a certain high level of assets.

VI. NATURE AND QUALITY OF THE ADVISER’S SERVICES,
INCLUDING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FUND

With assets under management of approximately \$463 billion as of September 30, 2015, the Adviser has the investment experience to manage and provide non-investment services (described in Section I) to the Fund.

The information prepared by Lipper Broadridge shows the 1, 3, 5 and 10 year performance returns and rankings²¹ of the Fund relative to its Broadridge Performance Group (“PG”) and Broadridge Performance Universe (“PU”)²² for the period ended July 31, 2015.²³

	Fund Return (%)	PG Median (%)	PU Median (%)	PG Rank	PU Rank
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio					
1 year	2.78	2.36	2.13	4/16	13/66
3 year	2.14	2.04	2.10	6/16	27/60
5 year	3.77	3.72	3.78	7/14	28/54
10 year	4.88	4.88	4.89	6/11	20/38

Set forth below are the 1, 3, 5, 10 year and since inception performance returns of the Fund (in bold) versus its benchmark.²⁴ Fund and benchmark volatility and reward-to-variability ratio (“Sharpe Ratio”) information is also shown.²⁵

²¹ Fund performance returns were provided by Broadridge.

²² The Fund’s PG/PU is not identical to the Fund’s EG/EU as the criteria for including/excluding a fund from a PG/PU is somewhat different from that of an EG/EU.

²³ The current Lipper investment classification/objective dictates the PG and PU throughout the life of the Fund even if the Fund had a different investment classification/objective at a different point in time.

²⁴ The Adviser provided Fund and benchmark performance return information for periods through July 31, 2015.

²⁵ Fund and benchmark volatility and Sharpe Ratio information was obtained through Lipper LANA, a database maintained by Lipper. Volatility is a statistical measure of the tendency of a market price or yield to vary over time. A Sharpe Ratio is a risk adjusted measure of return that divides a fund’s return in excess of the riskless return by the fund’s standard deviation. A fund with a greater volatility would be viewed as more risky than a fund with equivalent performance but lower volatility; for that reason, a greater return would be demanded for the more risky fund. A fund with a higher Sharpe Ratio would be viewed as better performing than a fund with a lower Sharpe Ratio.

Period Ending July 31, 2015
Annualized Net Performance (%)

	1 Year <u>(%)</u>	3 Year <u>(%)</u>	5 Year <u>(%)</u>	10 Year <u>(%)</u>	Since Inception <u>(%)</u>	Annualized Volatility <u>(%)</u>	Annualized Sharpe <u>(%)</u>	Risk Period <u>(Year)</u>
Intermediate Duration Institutional Portfolio	2.79	2.14	3.77	4.89	5.06	4.06	0.83	10
Barclays Capital U.S Aggregate Bond Index <i>Inception Date: May 17, 2002</i>	2.82	1.60	3.27	4.61	4.86	3.25	0.96	10

CONCLUSION:

Based on the factors discussed above the Senior Officer's conclusion is that the proposed advisory fee for the Fund is reasonable and within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm's length in light of all the surrounding circumstances. This conclusion in respect of the Fund is based on an evaluation of all of these factors and no single factor was dispositive.

Dated: November 25, 2015