

This attachment contains the two most recent Senior Officer Fee Summaries for the Fund.

THE FOLLOWING IS NOT PART OF THE SHAREHOLDER REPORT OR THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

SUMMARY OF SENIOR OFFICER'S EVALUATION OF
INVESTMENT ADVISORY AGREEMENT¹

The following is a summary of the evaluation of the Investment Advisory Agreement between AllianceBernstein L.P. (the "Adviser") and AllianceBernstein Equity Income Fund, Inc. (the "Fund"),^{2, 3} prepared by Philip L. Kirstein, the Senior Officer of the Fund for the Directors of the Fund, as required by the August 2004 agreement between the Adviser and the New York State Attorney General (the "NYAG"). The Senior Officer's evaluation of the Investment Advisory Agreement is not meant to diminish the responsibility or authority of the Board of Directors to perform its duties pursuant to Section 15 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "40 Act") and applicable state law. The purpose of the summary is to provide shareholders with a synopsis of the independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the advisory fees proposed to be paid by the Fund which was provided to the Directors in connection with their review of the proposed approval of the continuance of the Investment Advisory Agreement.

The Senior Officer's evaluation considered the following factors:

1. Advisory fees charged to institutional and other clients of the Adviser for like services;

¹ It should be noted that the information in the fee evaluation was completed on April 25, 2014 and discussed with the Board of Directors on May 6-8, 2014.

² Future references to the Fund do not include "AllianceBernstein." References in the fee summary pertaining to performance and expense ratio rankings refer to the Class A shares of the Fund.

³ Effective September 1, 2010, the Fund changed its name from AllianceBernstein Utility Income Fund, Inc. to AllianceBernstein Equity Income Fund, Inc., eliminated its policy to invest at least 80% of its assets in companies in the utilities industry, and adopted its current investment strategy. In connection with the change in investment strategy, the Fund's Fund management team was changed.

2. Advisory fees charged by other mutual fund companies for like services;
3. Costs to the Adviser and its affiliates of supplying services pursuant to the advisory agreement, excluding any intra-corporate profit;
4. Profit margins of the Adviser and its affiliates from supplying such services;
5. Possible economies of scale as the Fund grows larger; and
6. Nature and quality of the Adviser's services including the performance of the Fund.

These factors, with the exception of the first factor, are generally referred to as the “*Gartenberg* factors,” which were articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1982. *Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.*, 694 F. 2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). On March 30, 2010, the Supreme Court held the *Gartenberg* decision was correct in its basic formulation of what §36(b) requires: to face liability under §36(b), “an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s length bargaining.” *Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.*, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010). In *Jones*, the Court stated the *Gartenberg* approach fully incorporates the correct understanding of fiduciary duty within the context of section 36(b) and noted with approval that “*Gartenberg* insists that all relevant circumstances be taken into account” and “uses the range of fees that might result from arm’s length bargaining as the benchmark for reviewing challenged fees.”⁴

⁴ *Jones v. Harris* at 1427.

FUND ADVISORY FEES, EXPENSE REIMBURSEMENTS & RATIOS

The Adviser proposed that the Fund pays the advisory fee set forth in the table below for receiving the services to be provided pursuant to the Investment Advisory Agreement. The fee schedule below, implemented in January 2004 in consideration of the Adviser's settlement with the NYAG in December 2003, is based on a master schedule that contemplates eight categories of funds with almost all funds in each category having the same advisory fee schedule. Also shown are the Fund's net assets on March 31, 2014.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Advisory Fee</u>	<u>Net Assets 3/31/14 (\$MIL)</u>	<u>Fund</u>
Value	0.55% on 1 st \$2.5 billion 0.45% on next \$2.5 billion 0.40% on the balance	\$869.4	Equity Income Fund, Inc.

The Adviser is reimbursed as specified in the Investment Advisory Agreement for certain clerical, legal, accounting, administrative and other services provided to the Fund. During the Fund's most recently completed fiscal year, the Adviser received \$50,559 (0.007% of the Fund's average daily net assets) for such services.

The Adviser has agreed to waive that portion of its management fees and/or reimburse the Fund for that portion of the Fund's total operating expenses to the degree necessary to limit the Fund's total expense ratios to the amounts set forth below for the Fund's fiscal year. The waiver is terminable by the Adviser at the end of the Fund's fiscal year upon at least 60 days' written notice prior to the Fund's prospectus update. All of the Fund's share classes were operating below their expense caps for the most recently completed fiscal year. Accordingly, the expense limitation undertakings for

those share classes were of no effect. Also, set forth below are the gross expense ratios of the Fund for the most recently completed fiscal year:

<u>Fund</u>	Expense Cap Pursuant to Expense Limitation <u>Undertaking</u>	Gross Expense <u>Ratio</u>	<u>Fiscal Year End</u>
Equity Income Fund, Inc. ⁵	Advisor	0.95%	0.77%
	Class A	1.25%	1.07%
	Class B	1.95%	1.79%
	Class C	1.95%	1.78%
	Class R	1.45%	1.40%
	Class K	1.20%	1.09%
	Class I	0.95%	0.76%
	Class Z	0.95%	0.67%

I. ADVISORY FEES CHARGED TO INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CLIENTS

The advisory fees charged to investment companies which the Adviser manages and sponsors are normally higher than those charged to similar sized institutional accounts, including pension plans and sub-advised investment companies. The fee differential reflects, among other things, different services provided to such clients, and different liabilities assumed. Services provided by the Adviser to the Fund that are not provided to non-investment company clients and sub-advised investment companies include providing office space and personnel to serve as Fund Officers, who among other responsibilities make the certifications required under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and coordinating with and monitoring the Fund’s third party service providers such as Fund counsel, auditors, custodians, transfer agents and pricing services. The accounting, administrative, legal and compliance requirements for the Fund are more costly than those for institutional assets due to the greater complexities and time required for investment companies, although as previously noted, the Adviser is entitled to be

⁵ Expense caps effective September 1, 2010. Class Z expense cap effective October 15, 2013.

reimbursed for providing such services. Also, retail mutual funds managed by the Adviser are widely held. Servicing the Fund's investors is more time consuming and labor intensive compared to institutional clients since the Adviser needs to communicate with a more extensive network of financial intermediaries and shareholders. The Adviser also believes that it incurs substantial entrepreneurial risk when offering a new mutual fund since establishing a new mutual fund requires a large upfront investment and it may take a long time for the fund to achieve profitability since the fund must be priced to scale from inception in order to be competitive and assets are acquired one account at a time. In addition, managing the cash flow of an investment company may be more difficult than managing that of a stable pool of assets, such as an institutional account with little cash movement in either direction, particularly, if a fund is in net redemption and the Adviser is frequently forced to sell securities to raise cash for redemptions. However, managing a fund with positive cash flow may be easier at times than managing a stable pool of assets. Finally, in recent years, investment advisers have been sued by institutional clients and have suffered reputational damage both by the attendant publicity and outcomes other than complete victories. Accordingly, the legal and reputational risks associated with institutional accounts are greater than previously thought, although still not equal to those related to the mutual fund industry.

Notwithstanding the Adviser's view that managing an investment company is not comparable to managing other institutional accounts because the services provided are different, the Supreme Court has indicated consideration should be given to the advisory

fees charged to institutional accounts with a similar investment style as the Fund.⁶ In addition to the AllianceBernstein Institutional fee schedule, set forth below is what would have been the effective advisory fee of the Fund had the AllianceBernstein Institutional fee schedule been applicable to the Fund based on March 31, 2014 net assets.⁷

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Net Assets 3/31/14 (\$MM)</u>	<u>AllianceBernstein Institutional Fee Schedule</u>	<u>Effective AB Inst. Adv. Fee</u>	<u>Fund Advisory Fee</u>
Equity Income Fund, Inc.	\$869.4	U.S. Equity Income 0.65% on 1 st \$25 million 0.50% on next \$25 million 0.40% on next \$50 million 0.30% on next \$100 million 0.25% on the balance <i>Minimum Account Size: \$25m</i>	0.283%	0.550%

The Adviser represented that it does not provide any sub-advisory investment services to other investment companies that have a substantially similar investment style as the Fund.

II. MANAGEMENT FEES CHARGED BY OTHER MUTUAL FUND COMPANIES FOR LIKE SERVICES.

Lipper, Inc. (“Lipper”), an analytical service that is not affiliated with the Adviser, compared the fees charged to the Fund with fees charged to other investment companies for similar services offered by other investment advisers.⁸ Lipper’s analysis included the comparison of the Fund’s contractual management fee, estimated at the

⁶ The Supreme Court stated that “courts may give such comparisons the weight that they merit in light of the similarities and differences between the services that the clients in question require, but the courts must be wary of inapt comparisons.” Among the significant differences the Supreme Court noted that may exist between services provided to mutual funds and institutional accounts are “higher marketing costs.” *Jones v. Harris* at 1428.

⁷ The Adviser has indicated that with respect to institutional accounts with assets greater than \$300 million, it will negotiate a fee schedule. Discounts that are negotiated vary based upon each client relationship.

⁸ The Supreme Court cautioned against accepting mutual fund fee comparisons without careful scrutiny since “these comparisons are problematic because these fees, like those challenged, may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm’s length.” *Jones v. Harris* at 1429.

approximate current asset level of the Fund, to the median of the Fund’s Lipper Expense Group (“EG”)⁹ and the Fund’s contractual management fee ranking.¹⁰

Lipper describes an EG as a representative sample of comparable funds. Lipper’s standard methodology for screening funds to be included in an EG entails the consideration of several fund criteria, including fund type, investment classification/objective, load type and similar 12b-1/non-12b-1 service fees, asset (size) comparability, expense components and attributes. An EG will typically consist of seven to twenty funds.

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Contractual Management Fee (%)</u> ¹¹	<u>Lipper EG Median (%)</u>	<u>Lipper EG Rank</u>
Equity Income Fund, Inc.	0.550	0.733	1/14

Lipper also compared the Fund’s total expense ratio to the medians of the Fund’s EG and Lipper Expense Universe (“EU”). The EU is a broader group compared to the EG, consisting of all funds that have the same investment classifications/objective and load type as the subject Fund. Set forth below is Lipper’s comparison of the Fund’s total expense ratio and the median of the Fund’s EG and EU. The Fund’s total expense ratio ranking is also shown.

⁹ Lipper does not consider average account size when constructing EGs. Funds with relatively small average account sizes tend to have higher transfer agent expense ratio than comparable sized funds that have relatively large average account sizes. There are limitations to Lipper expense category data because different funds categorize expenses differently.

¹⁰ The contractual management fee is calculated by Lipper using the Fund’s contractual management fee rate at a hypothetical asset level. The hypothetical asset level is based on the combined net assets of all classes of the Fund, rounded up to the next \$25 million. Lipper’s total expense ratio information is based on the most recent annual report except as otherwise noted. A ranking of “1” would mean that a Fund had the lowest effective fee rate in the Lipper peer group.

¹¹ The contractual management fee does not reflect any expense reimbursements made by the Fund to the Adviser for certain clerical, legal, accounting, administrative, and other services. In addition, the contractual management fee does not reflect any advisory fee waivers or expense reimbursements made by the Adviser that would effectively reduce the actual effective management fee.

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Total Expense Ratio (%)</u> ¹²	<u>Lipper EG Median (%)</u>	<u>Lipper EG Rank</u>	<u>Lipper EU Median (%)</u>	<u>Lipper EU Rank</u>
Equity Income Fund, Inc.	1.075	1.168	1/14	1.151	17/49

Based on this analysis, the Fund has equally favorable rankings on a contractual management fee basis and on a total expense ratio basis.

III. COSTS TO THE ADVISER AND ITS AFFILIATES OF SUPPLYING SERVICES PURSUANT TO THE MANAGEMENT FEE ARRANGEMENT, EXCLUDING ANY INTRA-CORPORATE PROFIT.

The Adviser utilizes two profitability reporting systems, which operate independently but are aligned with each other, to estimate the Adviser’s profitability in connection with investment advisory services provided to the Fund. The Senior Officer has retained a consultant to provide independent advice regarding the alignment of the two profitability systems as well as the methodologies and allocations utilized by both profitability systems. See Section IV for additional discussion.

IV. PROFIT MARGINS OF THE ADVISER AND ITS AFFILIATES FOR SUPPLYING SUCH SERVICES.

The Fund’s profitability information, prepared by the Adviser for the Board of Directors, was reviewed by the Senior Officer and the consultant. The Adviser’s profitability from providing investment advisory services to the Fund increased during calendar year 2013, relative to 2012.

In addition to the Adviser’s direct profits from managing the Fund, certain of the Adviser’s affiliates have business relationships with the Fund and may earn a profit from providing other services to the Fund. The courts have referred to this type of business opportunity as “fall-out benefits” to the Adviser and indicated that such benefits should

¹² Most recently completed fiscal year Class A share total expense ratio.

be factored into the evaluation of the total relationship between the Fund and the Adviser. Neither case law nor common business practice precludes the Adviser's affiliates from earning a reasonable profit on this type of relationship provided the affiliates' charges and services are competitive and the relationship otherwise complies with the 40 Act restrictions. These affiliates provide transfer agent, distribution and brokerage related services to the Fund and receive transfer agent fees, Rule 12b-1 payments, front-end sales loads, contingent deferred sales charges ("CDSC") and brokerage commissions. In addition, the Adviser benefits from soft dollar arrangements which offset expenses the Adviser would otherwise incur.

AllianceBernstein Investments, Inc. ("ABI"), an affiliate of the Adviser, is the Fund's principal underwriter. ABI and the Adviser have disclosed in the Fund's prospectus that they may make revenue sharing payments from their own resources, in addition to resources derived from sales loads and Rule 12b-1 fees, to firms that sell shares of the Fund. The total amount paid to a financial intermediary associated with the sale of shares will generally not exceed the sum of (a) 0.25% of the current year's fund sales by that firm and (b) 0.10% of the average daily net assets attributable to that firm over the year. In 2013, ABI paid approximately 0.05% of the average monthly assets of the AllianceBernstein Mutual Funds or approximately \$19.4 million for distribution services and educational support (revenue sharing payments).

During the Fund's most recently completed fiscal year, ABI received from the Fund \$72,788, \$2,215,181 and \$27,545 in front-end sales charges, Rule 12b-1 and CDSC fees, respectively.

Fees and reimbursements for out of pocket expenses charged by AllianceBernstein Investor Services, Inc. (“ABIS”), the affiliated transfer agent for the Fund, are based on the level of the network account and the class of shares held by the account. ABIS also receives a fee per shareholder sub-account for each account maintained by an intermediary on an omnibus basis. During the Fund’s most recently completed fiscal year, ABIS received \$287,808 in fees from the Fund.

The Fund did not effect brokerage transactions and pay commissions to the Adviser’s affiliate, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., LLC (“SCB & Co.”) nor its U.K. affiliate, Sanford C. Bernstein Limited (“SCB Ltd.”), collectively “SCB,” during the Fund’s most recently completed fiscal year. The Adviser represented that SCB’s profitability from business conducted in the future with the Fund would be comparable to the profitability of SCB’s dealings with other similar third party clients. In the ordinary course of business, SCB receives and pays liquidity rebates from electronic communications networks (“ECNs”) derived from trading for its clients. These credits and charges are not being passed onto any SCB client. The Adviser also receives certain soft dollar benefits from brokers that execute agency trades for its clients. These soft dollar benefits reduce the Adviser’s cost of doing business and increase its profitability.

V. POSSIBLE ECONOMIES OF SCALE

The Adviser has indicated that economies of scale are being shared with shareholders through pricing to scale, breakpoints, fee reductions/waivers and enhancement to services.

In May 2012, an independent consultant, retained by the Senior Officer, provided the Board of Directors information on the Adviser’s firm-wide average costs from 2005

through 2011 and the potential economies of scale. The independent consultant noted that from 2005 through 2007 the Adviser experienced significant growth in assets under management (“AUM”). During this period, operating expenses increased, in part to keep up with growth, and in part reflecting market returns. However, from 2008 through the first quarter of 2009, AUM rapidly and significantly decreased due to declines in market value and client withdrawals. When AUM rapidly decreased, some operating expenses categories, including base compensation and office space, adjusted more slowly during this period, resulting in an increase in average costs. Since 2009, AUM has experienced less significant changes. The independent consultant noted that changes in operating expenses reflect changes in business composition and business practices in response to changes in financial markets. Finally, the independent consultant concluded that the increase in average cost and the decline in net operating margin across the Adviser since late 2008 are inconsistent with the view that there are currently reductions in average costs due to economies of scale that can be shared with the AllianceBernstein Mutual Funds managed by the Adviser through lower fees.

Previously, in February 2008, the independent consultant provided the Board of Directors an update of the Deli¹³ study on advisory fees and various fund characteristics.¹⁴ The independent consultant first reiterated the results of his previous two dimensional comparison analysis (fund size and family size) with the Board of

¹³ The Deli study, originally published in 2002 based on 1997 data and updated for the February 2008 Presentation, may be of diminished value due to the age of the data used in the presentation and the changes experienced in the industry over the last four years.

¹⁴ As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court cautioned against accepting mutual fund fee comparisons without careful scrutiny since the fees may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm’s length. See *Jones V. Harris* at 1429.

Directors.¹⁵ The independent consultant then discussed the results of the regression model that was utilized to study the effects of various factors on advisory fees. The regression model output indicated that the bulk of the variation in fees predicted were explained by various factors, but substantially by fund AUM, family AUM, index fund indicator and investment style. The independent consultant also compared the advisory fees of the AllianceBernstein Mutual Funds to similar funds managed by 19 other large asset managers, regardless of the fund size and each Adviser's proportion of mutual fund assets to non-mutual fund assets.

VI. NATURE AND QUALITY OF THE ADVISER'S SERVICES, INCLUDING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FUND

With assets under management of approximately \$454 billion as of March 31, 2014, the Adviser has the investment experience to manage and provide non-investment services (described in Section I) to the Fund.

The information prepared by Lipper shows the 1, 3, 5 and 10 year performance returns and rankings¹⁶ of the Fund relative to its Lipper Performance Group ("PG") and Lipper Performance Universe ("PU")¹⁷ for the periods ended February 28, 2014.^{18, 19}

¹⁵ The two dimensional analysis showed patterns of lower advisory fees for funds with larger asset sizes and funds from larger family sizes compared to funds with smaller asset sizes and funds from smaller family sizes, which according to the independent consultant is indicative of a sharing of economies of scale and scope. However, in less liquid and active markets, such is not the case, as the empirical analysis showed potential for diseconomies of scale in those markets. The empirical analysis also showed diminishing economies of scale and scope as funds surpassed a certain high level of assets.

¹⁶ The performance returns and rankings of the Fund are for the Fund's Class A shares. It should be noted that performance returns of the Fund were provided by Lipper.

¹⁷ The Fund's PG is identical to the Fund's EG. The Fund's PU is not identical to the Fund's EU as the criteria for including/excluding a fund from a PU is somewhat different from that of an EU.

¹⁸ The current Lipper investment classification/objective dictates the PG and PU throughout the life of the Fund even if a fund had a different investment classification/objective at a different point in time.

¹⁹ The Fund's Lipper classification changed in 2010 from Utility Funds to Equity Income Funds as are result of changes to the Fund's strategy.

	<u>Fund Return (%)</u>	<u>PG Median (%)</u>	<u>PU Median (%)</u>	<u>PG Rank</u>	<u>PU Rank</u>
1 year	21.84	21.56	20.09	7/14	25/65
3 year	12.02	12.77	12.42	10/13	31/50
5 year	18.10	19.59	20.25	11/13	40/45
10 year	11.02	7.68	7.71	1/9	1/31

Set forth below are the 1, 3, 5 and 10 year and since inception performance returns of the Fund (in bold)²⁰ versus its benchmark.²¹ Fund and benchmark volatility and reward-to-variability ratio (“Sharpe Ratio”) information is also shown.²²

	Periods Ending February 28, 2014							
	Annualized Performance							
	<u>1 Year (%)</u>	<u>3 Year (%)</u>	<u>5 Year (%)</u>	<u>10 Year (%)</u>	<u>Since Inception (%)</u>	<u>Annualized Volatility (%)</u>	<u>Annualized Sharpe (%)</u>	<u>Risk Period (Year)</u>
Equity Income Fund, Inc. ²⁰	21.84	12.02	18.10	11.02	9.41	13.18	0.73	10
S&P 500 Index	25.37	14.35	23.00	7.16	9.07	14.65	0.43	10
<i>Inception Date: October 18, 1993</i>								

CONCLUSION:

Based on the factors discussed above the Senior Officer’s conclusion is that the proposed advisory fee for the Fund is reasonable and within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in light of all the surrounding circumstances. This

²⁰ The performance returns and risk measures shown in the table are for the Class A shares of the Fund.

²¹ The Adviser provided Fund and benchmark performance return information for periods through February 28, 2014.

²² Fund and benchmark volatility and Sharpe Ratio information was obtained through Lipper LANA, a database maintained by Lipper. Volatility is a statistical measure of the tendency of a market price or yield to vary over time. The Sharpe Ratio is a risk adjusted measure of return that divides a fund’s return in excess of the riskless return by the fund’s standard deviation. A fund with a greater volatility would be viewed as more risky than a fund with equivalent performance but lower volatility; for that reason, a greater return would be demanded for the more risky fund. A fund with a higher Sharpe Ratio would be viewed as better performing than a fund with a lower Sharpe Ratio.

conclusion in respect of the Fund is based on an evaluation of all of these factors and no single factor was dispositive.

Dated: June 5, 2014

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SUMMARY OF SENIOR OFFICER'S EVALUATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISORY AGREEMENT¹

The following is a summary of the evaluation of the Investment Advisory Agreement between AllianceBernstein L.P. (the "Adviser") and AllianceBernstein Equity Income Fund, Inc. (the "Fund"),^{2,3} prepared by Philip L. Kirstein, the Senior Officer of the Fund for the Directors of the Fund, as required by the August 2004 agreement between the Adviser and the New York State Attorney General (the "NYAG"). The Senior Officer's evaluation of the Investment Advisory Agreement is not meant to diminish the responsibility or authority of the Board of Directors to perform its duties pursuant to Section 15 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "40 Act") and applicable state law. The purpose of the summary is to provide shareholders with a synopsis of the independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the advisory fees proposed to be paid by the Fund which was provided to the Directors in connection with their review of the proposed approval of the continuance of the Investment Advisory Agreement.

The Senior Officer's evaluation considered the following factors:

1. Advisory fees charged to institutional and other clients of the Adviser for like services;
2. Advisory fees charged by other mutual fund companies for like services;

¹ It should be noted that the information in the fee evaluation was completed on April 22, 2013 and discussed with the Board of Directors on April 30-May 2, 2013.

² Future references to the Fund do not include "AllianceBernstein." References in the fee summary pertaining to performance and expense ratio rankings refer to the Class A shares of the Fund.

³ Effective September 1, 2010, the Fund changed its name from AllianceBernstein Utility Income Fund, Inc. to AllianceBernstein Equity Income Fund, Inc., eliminated its policy to invest at least 80% of its assets in companies in the utilities industry, and adopted its current investment strategy. In connection with the change in investment strategy, the Fund's Fund management team was changed.

3. Costs to the Adviser and its affiliates of supplying services pursuant to the advisory agreement, excluding any intra-corporate profit;
4. Profit margins of the Adviser and its affiliates from supplying such services;
5. Possible economies of scale as the Fund grows larger; and
6. Nature and quality of the Adviser's services including the performance of the Fund.

These factors, with the exception of the first factor, are generally referred to as the “*Gartenberg* factors,” which were articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1982. *Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.*, 694 F. 2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). On March 30, 2010, the Supreme Court held the *Gartenberg* decision was correct in its basic formulation of what §36(b) requires: to face liability under §36(b), “an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s length bargaining.” *Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.*, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010). In *Jones*, the Court stated the *Gartenberg* approach fully incorporates the correct understanding of fiduciary duty within the context of section 36(b) and noted with approval that “*Gartenberg* insists that all relevant circumstances be taken into account” and “uses the range of fees that might result from arm’s length bargaining as the benchmark for reviewing challenged fees.”⁴

FUND ADVISORY FEES, EXPENSE REIMBURSEMENTS & RATIOS

The Adviser proposed that the Fund pays the advisory fee set forth in the table below for receiving the services to be provided pursuant to the Investment Advisory

⁴ *Jones v. Harris* at 1427.

Agreement. The fee schedule below, implemented in January 2004 in consideration of the Adviser's settlement with the NYAG in December 2003, is based on a master schedule that contemplates eight categories of funds with almost all funds in each category having the same advisory fee schedule.⁵ Also shown are the Fund's net assets on March 31, 2013.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Advisory Fee</u> ⁶	<u>Net Assets</u> <u>3/31/13</u> <u>(\$MIL)</u>	<u>Fund</u>
Value	0.55% on 1 st \$2.5 billion 0.45% on next \$2.5 billion 0.40% on the balance	\$618.8	Equity Income Fund, Inc.

The Adviser is reimbursed as specified in the Investment Advisory Agreement for certain clerical, legal, accounting, administrative and other services provided to the Fund. During the Fund's most recently completed fiscal year, the Adviser received \$61,734 (0.013% of the Fund's average daily net assets) for such services.

The Adviser has agreed to waive that portion of its management fees and/or reimburse the Fund for that portion of the Fund's total operating expenses to the degree necessary to limit the Fund's total expense ratios to the amounts set forth below for the Fund's fiscal year. The waiver is terminable by the Adviser at the end of the Fund's fiscal year upon at least 60 days' written notice prior to the Fund's prospectus update. All of the Fund's share classes were operating below their expense caps for the most recently completed fiscal year. Accordingly, the expense limitation undertakings for those share

⁵ Most of the AllianceBernstein Mutual Funds, which the Adviser manages, were affected by the Adviser's settlement with the NYAG.

⁶ The advisory fee of the Fund is based on the percentage of the Fund's average daily net assets and is paid on a monthly basis.

classes were of no effect. Also, set forth below are the gross expense ratios of the Fund for the most recently completed fiscal year:

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Expense Cap Pursuant to Expense Limitation Undertaking</u>		<u>Gross Expense Ratio</u>	<u>Fiscal Year End</u>
Equity Income Fund, Inc.	Advisor	0.95%	0.82%	November 30
	Class A	1.25%	1.12%	
	Class B	1.95%	1.86%	
	Class C	1.95%	1.83%	
	Class R	1.45%	1.43%	
	Class K	1.20%	1.12%	
	Class I	0.95%	0.78%	

I. ADVISORY FEES CHARGED TO INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CLIENTS

The advisory fees charged to investment companies which the Adviser manages and sponsors are normally higher than those charged to similar sized institutional accounts, including pension plans and sub-advised investment companies. The fee differential reflects, among other things, different services provided to such clients, and different liabilities assumed. Services provided by the Adviser to the Fund that are not provided to non-investment company clients and sub-advised investment companies include providing office space and personnel to serve as Fund Officers, who among other responsibilities make the certifications required under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and coordinating with and monitoring the Fund’s third party service providers such as Fund counsel, auditors, custodians, transfer agents and pricing services. The accounting, administrative, legal and compliance requirements for the Fund are more costly than those for institutional assets due to the greater complexities and time required for investment companies, although as previously noted, the Adviser is reimbursed for providing such services. Also, retail mutual funds managed by the Adviser are widely

held. Servicing the Fund’s investors is more time consuming and labor intensive compared to institutional clients since the Adviser needs to communicate with a more extensive network of financial intermediaries and shareholders. The Adviser also believes that it incurs substantial entrepreneurial risk when offering a new mutual fund since establishing a new mutual fund requires a large upfront investment and it may take a long time for the fund to achieve profitability since the fund must be priced to scale from inception in order to be competitive and assets are acquired one account at a time. In addition, managing the cash flow of an investment company may be more difficult than managing that of a stable pool of assets, such as an institutional account with little cash movement in either direction, particularly, if a fund is in net redemption and the Adviser is frequently forced to sell securities to raise cash for redemptions. However, managing a fund with positive cash flow may be easier at times than managing a stable pool of assets. Finally, in recent years, investment advisers have been sued by institutional clients and have suffered reputational damage both by the attendant publicity and outcomes other than complete victories. Accordingly, the legal and reputational risks associated with institutional accounts are greater than previously thought, although still not equal to those related to the mutual fund industry.

Notwithstanding the Adviser’s view that managing an investment company is not comparable to managing other institutional accounts because the services provided are different, the Supreme Court has indicated consideration should be given to the advisory fees charged to institutional accounts with a similar investment style as the Fund.⁷ In

⁷ The Supreme Court stated that “courts may give such comparisons the weight that they merit in light of the similarities and differences between the services that the clients in question require, but the courts must be wary of inapt comparisons.” Among the significant differences the Supreme Court noted that may exist

addition to the AllianceBernstein Institutional fee schedule, set forth below is what would have been the effective advisory fee of the Fund had the AllianceBernstein Institutional fee schedule been applicable to the Fund based on March 31, 2013 net assets.⁸

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Net Assets 3/31/13 (\$MM)</u>	<u>AllianceBernstein Institutional Fee Schedule</u>	<u>Effective AB Inst. Adv. Fee</u>	<u>Fund Advisory Fee</u>
Equity Income Fund, Inc.	\$618.8	U.S. Equity Income 0.65% on 1 st \$25 million 0.50% on next \$25 million 0.40% on next \$50 million 0.30% on next \$100 million 0.25% on the balance <i>Minimum Account Size: \$25 m</i>	0.296%	0.550%

The Adviser represented that it does not provide any sub-advisory investment services to other investment companies that have a substantially similar investment style as the Fund.

II. MANAGEMENT FEES CHARGED BY OTHER MUTUAL FUND COMPANIES FOR LIKE SERVICES.

Lipper, Inc. (“Lipper”), an analytical service that is not affiliated with the Adviser, compared the fees charged to the Fund with fees charged to other investment companies for similar services offered by other investment advisers.⁹ Lipper’s analysis included the comparison of the Fund’s contractual management fee, estimated at the

between services provided to mutual funds and institutional accounts are “higher marketing costs.” *Jones v. Harris* at 1428.

⁸ The Adviser has indicated that with respect to institutional accounts with assets greater than \$300 million, it will negotiate a fee schedule. Discounts that are negotiated vary based upon each client relationship.

⁹ The Supreme Court cautioned against accepting mutual fund fee comparisons without careful scrutiny since “these comparisons are problematic because these fees, like those challenged, may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm’s length.” *Jones v. Harris* at 1429.

approximate current asset level of the Fund, to the median of the Fund’s Lipper Expense Group (“EG”)¹⁰ and the Fund’s contractual management fee ranking.¹¹

Lipper describes an EG as a representative sample of comparable funds. Lipper’s standard methodology for screening funds to be included in an EG entails the consideration of several fund criteria, including fund type, investment classification/objective, load type and similar 12b-1/non-12b-1 service fees, asset (size) comparability, expense components and attributes. An EG will typically consist of seven to twenty funds.

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Contractual Management Fee (%)</u> ¹²	<u>Lipper EG Median (%)</u>	<u>Lipper EG Rank</u>
Equity Income Fund, Inc.	0.550	0.700	1/12

Lipper also compared the Fund’s total expense ratio to the medians of the Fund’s EG and Lipper Expense Universe (“EU”). The EU is a broader group compared to the EG, consisting of all funds that have the same investment classifications/objective and load type as the subject Fund. Set forth below is Lipper’s comparison of the Fund’s total expense ratio and the median of the Fund’s EG and EU. The Fund’s total expense ratio ranking is also shown.

¹⁰ Lipper does not consider average account size when constructing EGs. Funds with relatively small average account sizes tend to have higher transfer agent expense ratio than comparable sized funds that have relatively large average account sizes. There are limitations to Lipper expense category data because different funds categorize expenses differently.

¹¹ The contractual management fee is calculated by Lipper using the Fund’s contractual management fee rate at a hypothetical asset level. The hypothetical asset level is based on the combined net assets of all classes of the Fund, rounded up to the next \$25 million. Lipper’s total expense ratio information is based on the most recent annual report except as otherwise noted. A ranking of “1” would mean that a Fund had the lowest effective fee rate in the Lipper peer group.

¹² The contractual management fee does not reflect any expense reimbursements made by the Fund to the Adviser for certain clerical, legal, accounting, administrative, and other services. In addition, the contractual management fee does not reflect any advisory fee waivers or expense reimbursements made by the Adviser that would effectively reduce the actual effective management fee.

<u>Fund</u>	<u>Total Expense Ratio (%)</u> ¹³	<u>Lipper EG Median (%)</u>	<u>Lipper EG Rank</u>	<u>Lipper EU Median (%)</u>	<u>Lipper EU Rank</u>
Equity Income Fund, Inc.	1.123	1.178	3/12	1.151	17/43

Based on this analysis, the Fund has a more favorable ranking on a contractual management fee basis than on a total expense ratio basis.

III. COSTS TO THE ADVISER AND ITS AFFILIATES OF SUPPLYING SERVICES PURSUANT TO THE MANAGEMENT FEE ARRANGEMENT, EXCLUDING ANY INTRA-CORPORATE PROFIT.

The Adviser utilizes two profitability reporting systems, which operate independently but are aligned with each other, to estimate the Adviser’s profitability in connection with investment advisory services provided to the Fund. The Senior Officer has retained a consultant to provide independent advice regarding the alignment of the two profitability systems as well as the methodologies and allocations utilized by both profitability systems. See Section IV for additional discussion.

IV. PROFIT MARGINS OF THE ADVISER AND ITS AFFILIATES FOR SUPPLYING SUCH SERVICES.

The Fund’s profitability information, prepared by the Adviser for the Board of Directors, was reviewed by the Senior Officer and the consultant. The Adviser’s profitability from providing investment advisory services to the Fund increased during calendar year 2012, relative to 2011.

In addition to the Adviser’s direct profits from managing the Fund, certain of the Adviser’s affiliates have business relationships with the Fund and may earn a profit from providing other services to the Fund. The courts have referred to this type of business opportunity as “fall-out benefits” to the Adviser and indicated that such benefits should

¹³ Most recently completed fiscal year Class A share total expense ratio.

be factored into the evaluation of the total relationship between the Fund and the Adviser. Neither case law nor common business practice precludes the Adviser's affiliates from earning a reasonable profit on this type of relationship provided the affiliates' charges and services are competitive and the relationship otherwise complies with the 40 Act restrictions. These affiliates provide transfer agent, distribution and brokerage related services to the Fund and receive transfer agent fees, Rule 12b-1 payments, front-end sales loads, contingent deferred sales charges ("CDSC") and brokerage commissions. In addition, the Adviser benefits from soft dollar arrangements which offset expenses the Adviser would otherwise incur.

AllianceBernstein Investments, Inc. ("ABI"), an affiliate of the Adviser, is the Fund's principal underwriter. ABI and the Adviser have disclosed in the Fund's prospectus that they may make revenue sharing payments from their own resources, in addition to resources derived from sales loads and Rule 12b-1 fees, to firms that sell shares of the Fund. In 2012, ABI paid approximately 0.05% of the average monthly assets of the AllianceBernstein Mutual Funds or approximately \$19 million for distribution services and educational support (revenue sharing payments).

During the Fund's most recently completed fiscal year, ABI received from the Fund \$52,684, \$1,523,544 and \$18,787 in front-end sales charges, Rule 12b-1 and CDSC fees, respectively.

Fees and reimbursements for out of pocket expenses charged by AllianceBernstein Investor Services, Inc. ("ABIS"), the affiliated transfer agent for the Fund, are based on the level of the network account and the class of shares held by the account. ABIS also receives a fee per shareholder sub-account for each account

maintained by an intermediary on an omnibus basis. During the Fund's most recently completed fiscal year, ABIS received \$237,872 in fees from the Fund.

The Fund did not effect brokerage transactions and pay commissions to the Adviser's affiliate, Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., LLC ("SCB & Co.") nor its U.K. affiliate, Sanford C. Bernstein Limited ("SCB Ltd."), collectively "SCB," during the Fund's most recently completed fiscal year. The Adviser represented that SCB's profitability from business conducted in the future with the Fund would be comparable to the profitability of SCB's dealings with other similar third party clients. In the ordinary course of business, SCB receives and pays liquidity rebates from electronic communications networks ("ECNs") derived from trading for its clients. These credits and charges are not being passed onto any SCB client. The Adviser also receives certain soft dollar benefits from brokers that execute agency trades for its clients. These soft dollar benefits reduce the Adviser's cost of doing business and increase its profitability.

V. POSSIBLE ECONOMIES OF SCALE

The Adviser has indicated that economies of scale are being shared with shareholders through pricing to scale, breakpoints, fee reductions/waivers and enhancement to services.

In May 2012, an independent consultant, retained by the Senior Officer, provided the Board of Directors information on the Adviser's firm-wide average costs from 2005 through 2011 and the potential economies of scale. The independent consultant noted that from 2005 through 2007 the Adviser experienced significant growth in assets under management ("AUM"). During this period, operating expenses increased, in part to keep up with growth, and in part reflecting market returns. However, from 2008 through the

first quarter of 2009, AUM rapidly and significantly decreased due to declines in market value and client withdrawals. When AUM rapidly decreased, some operating expenses categories, including base compensation and office space, adjusted more slowly during this period, resulting in an increase in average costs. Since 2009, AUM has experienced less significant changes. The independent consultant noted that changes in operating expenses reflect changes in business composition and business practices in response to changes in financial markets. Finally, the independent consultant concluded that the increase in average cost and the decline in net operating margin across the Adviser since late 2008 are inconsistent with the view that there are currently reductions in average costs due to economies of scale that can be shared with the AllianceBernstein Mutual Funds managed by the Adviser through lower fees.

Previously, in February 2008, the independent consultant provided the Board of Directors an update of the Deli¹⁴ study on advisory fees and various fund characteristics.¹⁵ The independent consultant first reiterated the results of his previous two dimensional comparison analysis (fund size and family size) with the Board of Directors.¹⁶ The independent consultant then discussed the results of the regression model that was utilized to study the effects of various factors on advisory fees. The regression model output indicated that the bulk of the variation in fees predicted were

¹⁴ The Deli study, originally published in 2002 based on 1997 data and updated for the February 2008 Presentation, may be of diminished value due to the age of the data used in the presentation and the changes experienced in the industry over the last four years.

¹⁵ As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court cautioned against accepting mutual fund fee comparisons without careful scrutiny since the fees may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm's length. See *Jones V. Harris* at 1429.

¹⁶ The two dimensional analysis showed patterns of lower advisory fees for funds with larger asset sizes and funds from larger family sizes compared to funds with smaller asset sizes and funds from smaller family sizes, which according to the independent consultant is indicative of a sharing of economies of scale and scope. However, in less liquid and active markets, such is not the case, as the empirical analysis showed potential for diseconomies of scale in those markets. The empirical analysis also showed diminishing economies of scale and scope as funds surpassed a certain high level of assets.

explained by various factors, but substantially by fund AUM, family AUM, index fund indicator and investment style. The independent consultant also compared the advisory fees of the AllianceBernstein Mutual Funds to similar funds managed by 19 other large asset managers, regardless of the fund size and each Adviser’s proportion of mutual fund assets to non-mutual fund assets.

VI. NATURE AND QUALITY OF THE ADVISER’S SERVICES, INCLUDING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FUND

With assets under management of approximately \$443 billion as of March 31, 2013, the Adviser has the investment experience to manage and provide non-investment services (described in Section I) to the Fund.

The information prepared by Lipper shows the 1, 3, 5 and 10 year performance returns and rankings¹⁷ of the Fund relative to its Lipper Performance Group (“PG”) and Lipper Performance Universe (“PU”)¹⁸ for the periods ended February 28, 2013.^{19, 20}

	<u>Fund</u> <u>Return (%)</u>	<u>PG</u> <u>Median (%)</u>	<u>PU</u> <u>Median (%)</u>	<u>PG</u> <u>Rank</u>	<u>PU</u> <u>Rank</u>
1 year	10.54	10.93	11.86	9/12	44/57
3 year	15.20	12.10	12.66	1/11	3/44
5 year	3.87	4.20	4.57	7/11	30/42
10 year	11.88	8.43	8.93	1/5	1/25

Set forth below are the 1, 3, 5 and 10 year and since inception performance returns of the Fund (in bold)²¹ versus its benchmark.²² Fund and benchmark volatility and reward-to-variability ratio (“Sharpe Ratio”) information is also shown.²³

¹⁷ The performance returns and rankings of the Fund are for the Fund’s Class A shares. It should be noted that performance returns of the Fund were provided by Lipper.

¹⁸ The Fund’s PG is identical to the Fund’s EG. The Fund’s PU is not identical to the Fund’s EU as the criteria for including/excluding a fund from a PU is somewhat different from that of an EU.

¹⁹ The current Lipper investment classification/objective dictates the PG and PU throughout the life of the Fund even if a fund had a different investment classification/objective at a different point in time.

²⁰ The Fund’s Lipper classification changed in 2010 from Utility Funds to Equity Income Funds as are result of changes to the Fund’s strategy.

	Periods Ending February 28, 2013							
	Annualized Performance							
	1 Year (%)	3 Year (%)	5 Year (%)	10 Year (%)	Since Inception (%)	Annualized Volatility (%)	Annualized Sharpe (%)	Risk Period (Year)
Equity Income Fund, Inc.²⁰	10.54	15.20	3.87	11.88	8.80	13.22	0.78	10
S&P 500 Index	13.46	13.50	4.94	8.24	8.30	14.71	0.49	10
S&P 500 Utility Index	11.88	13.52	4.26	12.09	6.45	N/A	N/A	N/A

Inception Date: October 18, 1993

CONCLUSION:

Based on the factors discussed above the Senior Officer's conclusion is that the proposed advisory fee for the Fund is reasonable and within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm's-length in light of all the surrounding circumstances. This conclusion in respect of the Fund is based on an evaluation of all of these factors and no single factor was dispositive.

Dated: May 29, 2013

²¹ The performance returns and risk measures shown in the table are for the Class A shares of the Fund.

²² The Adviser provided Fund and benchmark performance return information for periods through February 28, 2013.

²³ Fund and benchmark volatility and Sharpe Ratio information was obtained through Lipper LANA, a database maintained by Lipper. Volatility is a statistical measure of the tendency of a market price or yield to vary over time. The Sharpe Ratio is a risk adjusted measure of return that divides a fund's return in excess of the riskless return by the fund's standard deviation. A fund with a greater volatility would be viewed as more risky than a fund with equivalent performance but lower volatility; for that reason, a greater return would be demanded for the more risky fund. A fund with a higher Sharpe Ratio would be viewed as better performing than a fund with a lower Sharpe Ratio.