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1. Introduction

As an investment adviser, we are shareholder advocates and have a fiduciary duty to make investment decisions that are in our clients’ best interests by maximizing the value of their shares. Proxy voting is an integral part of this process, through which we support strong corporate governance structures, shareholder rights, and transparency.

We have an obligation to vote proxies in a timely manner and we apply the principles in this policy to our proxy decisions. We believe a company’s environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) practices may have a significant effect on the value of the company, and we take these factors into consideration when voting. For additional information regarding our ESG policies and practices, please refer to our firm’s Statement of Policy Regarding Responsible Investment (“RI Policy”).

This Proxy Voting Policy (“Proxy Voting Policy” or “Policy”), which outlines our policies for proxy voting and includes a wide range of issues that often appear on proxies, applies to all of AllianceBernstein’s investment management subsidiaries and investment services groups investing on behalf of clients globally. It is intended for use by those involved in the proxy voting decision-making process and those responsible for the administration of proxy voting (“Proxy Managers”), in order to ensure that our proxy voting policies and procedures are implemented consistently.

We sometimes manage accounts where proxy voting is directed by clients or newly-acquired subsidiary companies. In these cases, voting decisions may deviate from this Policy.

2. Research Underpins Decision Making

As a research-driven firm, we approach our proxy voting responsibilities with the same commitment to rigorous research and engagement that we apply to all of our investment activities. The different investment philosophies utilized by our investment teams may occasionally result in different conclusions being drawn regarding certain proposals and, in turn, may result in the Proxy Manager making different voting decisions on the same proposal. Nevertheless, the Proxy Manager votes proxies with the goal of maximizing the value of the securities in client portfolios.

In addition to our firm-wide proxy voting policies, we have a Proxy Committee, which provides oversight and includes senior investment professionals from Equities, Legal personnel and Operations personnel. It is the responsibility of the Proxy Committee to evaluate and maintain proxy voting procedures and guidelines, to evaluate proposals and issues not covered by these guidelines, to consider changes in policy, and to review the Proxy Voting Policy no less frequently than annually. In addition, the Proxy Committee meets as necessary to address special situations.

Research Services

We subscribe to the corporate governance and proxy research services of Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”). All our investment professionals can access these materials via the Proxy Manager and/or Proxy Committee.

Engagement

In evaluating proxy issues and determining our votes, we welcome and seek out the points of view of various parties. Internally, the Proxy Manager may consult the Proxy Committee, Chief Investment Officers, Directors of Research, and/or Research Analysts across our equities platforms, and Portfolio Managers in whose managed accounts a stock is held. Externally, the Proxy Manager may engage with company management, company directors, interest groups, shareholder activists, other shareholders and research providers.
3. Proxy Voting Guidelines

Our proxy voting guidelines are principles-based rather than rules-based. We adhere to a core set of principles that are described in this Proxy Voting Policy. We assess each proxy proposal in light of these principles. Our proxy voting “litmus test” will always be what we view as most likely to maximize long-term shareholder value. We believe that authority and accountability for setting and executing corporate policies, goals and compensation generally should rest with the board of directors and senior management. In return, we support strong investor rights that allow shareholders to hold directors and management accountable if they fail to act in the best interests of shareholders.

With this as a backdrop, our proxy voting guidelines pertaining to specific issues are set forth below. We generally vote proposals in accordance with these guidelines but, consistent with our “principles-based” approach to proxy voting, we may deviate from the guidelines if warranted by the specific facts and circumstances of the situation (i.e., if, under the circumstances, we believe that deviating from our stated policy is necessary to help maximize long-term shareholder value). In addition, these guidelines are not intended to address all issues that may appear on all proxy ballots. Proposals not specifically addressed by these guidelines, whether submitted by management or shareholders, will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, always keeping in mind our fiduciary duty to make voting decisions that, by maximizing long-term shareholder value, are in our clients’ best interests.

3.1 Board and Director Proposals

1. Changes in Board Structure and Amending the Articles of Incorporation

| For | Against |
|-----------------------------------------------|
| Companies may propose various provisions with respect to the structure of the board of directors, including changing the manner in which board vacancies are filled, directors are nominated and the number of directors. Such proposals may require amending the charter or by-laws or may otherwise require shareholder approval. When these proposals are not controversial or meant as an anti-takeover device, which is generally the case, we vote in their favor. However, if we believe a proposal is intended as an anti-takeover device, we generally vote against. |
| Other changes in a company’s charter, articles of incorporation or by-laws are usually technical or administrative in nature. Absent a compelling reason to the contrary, we will support such proposals. However, we may oppose proposals that would permit management to establish the size of the board outside a specified range without shareholder approval. |

2. Classified Boards

A classified board typically is divided into three separate classes. Each class holds office for a term of two or three years. Only a portion of the board can be elected or replaced each year. Because this type of proposal has fundamental anti-takeover implications, we oppose the adoption of classified boards unless there is a justifiable financial reason or an adequate sunset provision exists. However, where a classified board already exists, we will not oppose directors who sit on such boards for that reason. We will vote against directors that fail to implement shareholder approved proposals to declassify boards.

3. Director Liability and Indemnification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case-by-case</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some companies argue that increased indemnification and decreased liability for directors are important to ensure the continued availability of competent directors. However, others argue that the risk of such personal liability minimizes the propensity for corruption and recklessness.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

We generally support indemnification provisions that are consistent with the local jurisdiction in which the company has been formed. We vote in favor of proposals adopting indemnification for directors with respect to acts conducted in the normal course of business. We also vote in favor of proposals that expand coverage for directors and officers where, despite an unsuccessful legal defense, we believe the director or officer acted in good faith and in the best interests of the company. We oppose indemnification for gross negligence.

4. Disclose CEO Succession Plan (SHP)  

Proposals like these are often suggested by shareholders of companies with long-tenured CEOs and/or high employee turnover rates. Even though some markets might not require the disclosure of a CEO succession plan, we do think it is good business practice and will support these proposals.

5. Election of Directors  

We generally vote in favor of the management-proposed slate of directors. However, we may not do so if we determine that there are compelling reasons to oppose directors (see below) or there is a proxy contest for seats on the board.

We believe that directors have a duty to respond to shareholder actions that have received significant shareholder support. We may vote against directors (or withhold votes for directors if plurality voting applies) who fail to act on key issues, such as failure to implement proposals to declassify boards, failure to implement a majority vote requirement, failure to submit a rights plan to a shareholder vote and failure to act on tender offers where a majority of shareholders have tendered their shares (provided we supported, or would have supported, the original proposal). In addition, we oppose directors who fail to attend at least 75% of board meetings within a given year without a reasonable excuse. Also, we may consider the number of boards on which a director sits and/or their length of service on a particular board. Finally, we may abstain or vote against (depending on a company’s history of disclosure in this regard) directors of issuers where there is insufficient information about the nominees disclosed in the proxy statement.

We believe companies should have a majority of independent directors and independent key committees. However, we will consider local market regulation as part of our decision. We will generally regard a director as independent if the director satisfies the criteria for independence (i) espoused by the primary exchange on which the company’s shares are traded, or (ii) set forth in the code we determine to be best practice in the country where the subject company is domiciled. We generally vote against directors who, during the previous fiscal year, failed to act on a majority supported shareholder proposal or engaged in what we believe to be a poor governance practice. We may also consider engaging company management (by phone, in writing and in person), until any issues have been satisfactorily resolved.

We may vote against directors for poor compensation practices. In our view, poor compensation practices include, for example, permitting option re-pricing without prior shareholder approval, providing continuous perquisites to an executive officer and his or her dependents after the officer is no longer employed by the company, adjusting performance-based diminished payouts with supplemental cash payments, eliminating performance goals for executive officers and crediting additional years of service to current executives for the purpose of enhancing the executive’s pension benefit. However, because we do not believe that permitting executive officers to receive dividends on unearned performance shares is a poor compensation practice, we will not oppose directors who permit this practice.
We consider the election of directors who are “bundled” on a single slate on a case-by-case basis considering the amount of information available and an assessment of the group’s qualifications.

a. Controlled Company Exemption Case-by-case

Companies where more than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, group or another company, need not comply with the requirement to have a majority of independent directors and independent key committees. Conversely, we will vote against directors for failure to adhere to such independence standards where shareholders with a majority voting interest have a minority economic interest.

Exchanges in certain jurisdictions do not have a controlled company exemption (or something similar). In such a jurisdiction, if a company has a majority shareholder or group of related majority shareholders with a majority economic interest, we generally will not oppose that company’s directors simply because the board does not include a majority of independent members. We will, however, consider these directors in a negative light if the company has a history of violating the rights of minority shareholders.

b. Voting for Director Nominees in a Contested Election Case-by-case

Votes in a contested election of directors are evaluated on a case-by-case basis with the goal of maximizing shareholder value.

6. Establish Additional Board Committees (SHP) Case-by-case

We believe that establishing committees should be the prerogative of a well-functioning board of directors. However, we may support shareholder proposals to establish additional board committees to address specific shareholder issues, including ESG issues.

7. Independent Lead Director (SHP) For

We support shareholder proposals that request a company to amend its by-laws to establish an independent lead director, if the positions of chairman and CEO are not separated. We view the existence of an independent lead director as a good example of the sufficient counter-balancing governance. If a company has an independent lead director in place, we will generally oppose a proposal to separate the positions of chairman and CEO.

8. Limit Term of Directorship; Establish Mandatory Retirement Age (SHP) Case-by-case

These proposals seek to limit the term during which a director may serve on a board to a set number of years and/or establish an age at which a director is no longer eligible to serve on the board. Proponents believe term limits and forced retirement help ensure that new ideas are introduced to the company. Opponents argue that director turnover decreases board stability.

Taking into consideration local market practice, we generally believe that a director's qualifications, not length of service, should be the primary factor considered. Accordingly, we generally oppose proposals that seek to either limit the term during which a director may serve on a company’s board or force a director’s retirement at a certain age.
9. **Majority of Independent Directors (SHP)**

Each company’s board of directors has a duty to act in the best interest of the company’s shareholders at all times. We believe that these interests are best served by having directors who bring objectivity to the company and are free from potential conflicts of interests. Accordingly, we support proposals seeking a majority of independent directors on the board. While we are aware of the listing requirements of the NYSE and NASDAQ (which require companies to have a majority of independent directors on their board), we will support such proposals regardless of where the company is listed.

10. **Majority of Independent Directors on Key Committees (SHP)**

In order to ensure that those who evaluate management’s performance, recruit directors and set management’s compensation are free from conflicts of interests, we believe that the audit, nominating/governance, and compensation committees should be composed of a majority of independent directors. While we are aware of the listing requirements of the NYSE and NASDAQ (that generally require fully independent nominating and compensation committees), we will support such proposals regardless of where the company is listed. However, in order to allow companies an opportunity to select qualified candidates for these important board positions, at this time we will not oppose inside directors that sit on these committees.

11. **Majority Votes for Directors (SHP)**

We believe that good corporate governance requires shareholders to have a meaningful voice in the affairs of the company. This objective is strengthened if directors are elected by a majority of votes cast at an annual meeting rather than by the plurality method commonly used. With plurality voting a director could be elected by a single affirmative vote even if the rest of the votes were withheld.

We further believe that majority voting provisions will lead to greater director accountability. Therefore, we support shareholder proposals that companies amend their by-laws to provide that director nominees be elected by an affirmative vote of a majority of the votes cast, provided the proposal includes a carve-out to provide for plurality voting in contested elections where the number of nominees exceeds the number of directors to be elected.

12. **Prohibit CEOs from Serving on Compensation Committees (SHP)**

These proposals seek to require a board of directors to adopt a policy prohibiting current and former chief executive officers of other public companies from serving on that company’s compensation committee. Proponents argue that having a current or former CEO serving on a compensation committee presents an inherent conflict of interest because the CEO is likely to support inflated compensation for his or her peers. Opponents argue, and we agree, that permitting CEOs to serve on compensation committees has merit because their experience with compensation matters (including oversight of executive pay) may be invaluable to a board. Accordingly, we generally oppose proposals seeking to prohibit CEOs from serving on compensation committees.

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1 For purposes of this Policy, an independent director is one that meets the requirements of independence pursuant to the listing standards of the exchange on which the common stock is listed.

2 Pursuant to the SEC rules, adopted pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as of October 31, 2004, each U.S. listed issuer must have a fully independent audit committee.
13. **Removal of Directors Without Cause (SHP)**  
Company by-laws sometimes define cause very narrowly, including only conditions of criminal indictment, final adverse adjudication that fiduciary duties were breached or incapacitation, while also providing shareholders with the right to remove directors only upon “cause”.

We believe that the circumstances under which shareholders have the right to remove directors should not be limited to those traditionally defined by companies as “cause”. We also believe that shareholders should have the right to conduct a vote to remove directors who fail to perform in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duties or representative of shareholders’ best interests. And, while we would prefer shareholder proposals that seek to broaden the definition of “cause” to include situations like these, we generally support proposals that would provide shareholders with the right to remove directors without cause.

14. **Require Independent Board Chairman (SHP)**  
Case-by-case

We believe there can be benefits to having the positions of chairman and CEO combined as well as split. When the position is combined the company must have sufficient counter-balancing governance in place, generally through a strong lead director. Also, for companies with smaller market capitalizations, separate chairman and CEO positions may not be practical.

15. **Require Two Candidates for Each Board Seat (SHP)**  
Against

We believe that proposals like these are detrimental to a company’s ability to attract highly qualified candidates. Accordingly, we oppose them.

16. **Stock Ownership Requirement (SHP)**  
Against

These proposals require directors to own a minimum amount of company stock in order to qualify as a director, or to remain on the board. We do not believe stock ownership is necessary to align the interests of directors and shareholders. Accordingly, we oppose these proposals.

3.2 **Compensation Proposals**

17. **Accelerated Vesting of Equity Compensation Awards-Change of Control (SHP)**  
Case-by-case

We examine proposals to prohibit accelerated vesting of equity awards in the event of a change in control on a case-by-case basis. If a change in control is triggered at or above a 50% ownership level, we generally support accelerated vesting. If, however, a change in control is triggered at less than 50% ownership, we generally oppose accelerated vesting.

18. **Adopt Form of Employment Contract (SHP)**  
Case-by-case

These proposals ask companies to adhere to certain principles when drafting employment contracts for executives. We will review the criteria requested and consider these proposals on a case-by-case basis.
19. **Adopt Policies to Prohibit any Death Benefits to Senior Executives (SHP)**  
Against

We view these bundled proposals as too restrictive and conclude that blanket restrictions on any and all such benefits, including the payment of life insurance premiums for senior executives, could put a company at a competitive disadvantage.

20. **Advisory Vote to Ratify Directors’ Compensation (SHP)**  
Case-by-case

Similar to advisory votes on executive compensation, shareholders may request a non-binding advisory vote to approve compensation given to board members which we evaluate on a case-by-case basis.

21. **Amend Executive Compensation Plan tied to Performance (Bonus Banking) (SHP)**  
Against

These proposals seek to force a company to amend executive compensation plans such that compensation awards tied to performance are deferred for shareholder specified and extended periods of time. As a result, awards may be adjusted downward if performance goals achieved during the vesting period are not sustained during the added deferral period.

We believe that most companies have adequate vesting schedules and clawbacks in place. Under such circumstances, we will oppose these proposals. However, if a company does not have what we believe to be adequate vesting and/or clawback requirements, we decide these proposals on a case-by-case basis.

22. **Approve Remuneration for Directors and Auditors**  
Case-by-case

We will vote on a case-by-case basis where we are asked to approve remuneration for directors or auditors. However, where disclosure relating to the details of such remuneration is inadequate or provided without sufficient time for us to consider our vote, we may abstain or vote against, depending on the adequacy of the company’s prior disclosures in this regard. Where appropriate, we engage the company directly.

23. **Approve Remuneration Reports**  
Case-by-case

In certain markets, (e.g., Australia, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States), publicly traded issuers are required by law to submit their company’s remuneration report to a non-binding shareholder vote. The report contains, among other things, the nature and amount of the compensation of the directors and certain executive officers as well as a discussion of the company’s performance.

We evaluate remuneration reports on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the reasonableness of the company’s compensation structure and the adequacy of the disclosure. Where a compensation plan permits retesting of performance-based awards, we will consider the specific terms of the plan, including the volatility of the industry and the number and duration of the retests. We may abstain or vote against a plan if disclosure of the remuneration details is inadequate or the report is not provided to shareholders with sufficient time prior to the meeting to consider its terms.

In markets where remuneration reports are not required for all companies, we will support shareholder proposals asking the board to adopt a policy (i.e., “say on pay”) that the company’s shareholders be given the opportunity to vote on an advisory resolution to approve the compensation committee’s report. Although say on pay votes are by nature only broad indications of shareholder views, they do lead to more compensation-related dialogue between
management and shareholders and help ensure that management and shareholders meet their common objective: maximizing the value of the company.

24. **Approve Retirement Bonuses for Directors (Japan and South Korea)  
   Case-by-case**

Retirement bonuses are normal practice in Japan and South Korea. Companies seek approval to give the board authority to grant retirement bonuses for directors and/or auditors and to leave the exact amount of bonuses to the board’s discretion. We will analyze such proposals on a case-by-case basis, considering management’s commitment to maximizing long-term shareholder value.

25. **Approve Special Payments to Continuing Directors and Auditors (Japan)  
   Case-by-case**

In conjunction with the abolishment of a company’s retirement allowance system, we will generally support special payment allowances for continuing directors and auditors if there is no evidence of their independence becoming impaired.

26. **Disclose Executive and Director Pay (SHP)  
   Case-by-case**

In December 2006 and again in February 2010, the SEC adopted rules requiring increased and/or enhanced compensation-related and corporate governance-related disclosure in proxy statements and Forms 10-K. Similar steps have been taken by regulators in foreign jurisdictions. We believe the rules enacted by the SEC and various foreign regulators generally ensure more complete and transparent disclosure. Therefore, while we will consider them on a case-by-case basis (analyzing whether there are any relevant disclosure concerns), we generally vote against shareholder proposals seeking additional disclosure of executive and director compensation, including proposals that seek to specify the measurement of performance-based compensation, if the company is subject to SEC rules or similar rules espoused by a regulator in a foreign jurisdiction. Similarly, we generally support proposals seeking additional disclosure of executive and director compensation if the company is not subject to any such rules.

27. **Exclude Pension Income from Performance-based Compensation (SHP)  
   For**

We are aware that companies may seek to artificially inflate earnings based on questionable assumptions about pension income. Even though these practices are acceptable under the relevant accounting rules, we believe that pension income is not an acceptable way to increase executive pay and that management’s discretion in estimating pension income is a potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, we support such proposals.

28. **Executive and Employee Compensation Plans  
   Case-by-case**

Executive and employee compensation plans (“Compensation Plans”) usually are complex and are a major corporate expense, so we evaluate them carefully and on a case-by-case basis. In all cases, however, we assess each proposed Compensation Plan within the framework of four guiding principles, each of which ensures a company’s Compensation Plan helps to align the long-term interests of management with shareholders:

- Valid measures of business performance tied to the firm’s strategy and shareholder value creation, which are clearly articulated and incorporate appropriate time periods, should be utilized;
- Compensation costs should be managed in the same way as any other expense;
• Compensation should reflect management’s handling, or failure to handle, any recent social, environmental, governance, ethical or legal issue that had a significant adverse financial or reputational effect on the company; and

• In granting compensatory awards, management should exhibit a history of integrity and decision-making based on logic and well thought out processes.

Where disclosure relating to the details of Compensation Plans is inadequate or provided without sufficient time for us to consider our vote, we may abstain or vote against, depending on the adequacy of the company’s prior disclosures in this regard. Where appropriate, we may raise the issue with the company directly or take other steps.

29. Limit Dividend Payments to Executives (SHP)  
Against

We believe that management, within reason, should be given latitude in determining the mix and types of awards offered to executive officers. Therefore, we oppose withholding the dividend payment on restricted stock awards, even if the stock is unvested, when these awards are used as part of incentive compensation; we believe these awards serve as an effective means of executive reward and retention. We do, however, believe that it is acceptable for a company to accumulate dividends and tie their payment to the achievement of performance goals and to stipulate that the dividends are forfeited if the employee does not achieve his or her goal.

30. Limit Executive Pay (SHP)  
Case-by-case

We believe that management and directors, within reason, should be given latitude in determining the mix and types of awards offered to executive officers. We vote against shareholder proposals seeking to limit executive pay if we deem them too restrictive. Depending on our analysis of the specific circumstances, we are generally against requiring a company to adopt a policy prohibiting tax gross up payments to senior executives.

31. Mandatory Holding Periods (SHP)  
Against

We generally vote against shareholder proposals asking companies to require a company’s executives to hold stock for a specified period of time after acquiring that stock by exercising company-issued stock options (i.e., precluding “cashless” option exercises), unless we believe implementing a mandatory holding period is necessary to help resolve underlying problems at a company that have hurt, and may continue to hurt, shareholder value.

32. Pay Directors Only in Stock (SHP)  
Against

As noted immediately above, we do not believe that stock ownership is necessary to align the interests of directors and shareholders. Further, we believe that the board should be given latitude in determining the mix and types of compensation offered to its members. Accordingly, we oppose these proposals.

33. Performance-based Stock Option Plans (SHP)  
Case-by-case

These shareholder proposals require a company to adopt a policy that all or a portion of future stock options granted to executives be performance-based. Performance-based options usually take the form of indexed options (where the option sale price is linked to the company’s stock performance versus an industry index), premium priced options (where the strike price is significantly above the market price at the time of the grant) or performance vesting options (where options vest when the company’s stock price exceeds a specific target). Proponents argue that performance-
based options provide an incentive for executives to outperform the market as a whole and prevent management from being rewarded for average performance. We believe that management, within reason, should be given latitude in determining the mix and types of awards it offers. However, we recognize the benefit of linking a portion of executive compensation to certain types of performance benchmarks. While we will not support proposals that require all options to be performance-based, we will generally support proposals that require a portion of options granted to senior executives be performance-based. However, because performance-based options can also result in unfavorable tax treatment and the company may already have in place an option plan that sufficiently ties executive stock option plans to the company’s performance, we will consider such proposals on a case-by-case basis.

34. **Prohibit Relocation Benefits to Senior Executives (SHP)**  
   **Against**

   We do not consider such perquisites to be problematic pay practices as long as they are properly disclosed. Therefore we will vote against shareholder proposals asking to prohibit relocation benefits.

35. **Recovery of Performance-based Compensation (SHP)**  
   **For**

   We generally support shareholder proposals requiring the board to seek recovery of performance-based compensation awards to senior management and directors in the event of a financial restatement (whether for fraud or other reasons) that resulted in their failure to achieve past performance targets. In deciding how to vote, we consider the adequacy of existing company clawback policy, if any.

36. **Single Trigger Change-in-Control Agreements (SHP)**  
   **Case-by-case**

   Companies often include single trigger change-in-control provisions (e.g., a provision stipulating that an employee’s unvested equity awards become fully vested upon a change-in-control of the company without any additional requirement) in employment agreements and compensation plans.

   We will not oppose directors who establish these provisions, nor will we oppose compensation plans that include them. However, we will examine on a case-by-case basis shareholder proposals calling for future employment agreements and compensation plans to include double trigger change-in-control provisions (e.g., a provision stipulating that an employee’s unvested equity awards become fully vested only after a change-in-control of the company and termination of employment).

37. **Submit Golden Parachutes / Severance Plans to a Shareholder Vote (SHP)**  
   **Case-by-case**

   Golden Parachutes assure key officers of a company lucrative compensation packages if the company is acquired and/or if the new owners terminate such officers. We recognize that offering generous compensation packages that are triggered by a change in control may help attract qualified officers. However, such compensation packages cannot be so excessive that they are unfair to shareholders or make the company unattractive to potential bidders, thereby serving as a constructive anti-takeover mechanism. Accordingly, we support proposals to submit severance plans (including supplemental retirement plans) that exceed 2.99 times the sum of an executive officer’s base salary plus bonus, and that are triggered by a change in control, to a shareholder vote, but we review proposals to ratify or redeem such plans on a case-by-case basis.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>38. Submit Golden Parachutes / Severance Plans to a Shareholder Vote prior to their being Negotiated by Management (SHP)</strong></td>
<td>Case-by-case</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We believe that in order to attract qualified employees, companies must be free to negotiate compensation packages without shareholder interference. Shareholders must then be given an opportunity to analyze a compensation plan’s final, material terms in order to ensure it is within acceptable limits. Accordingly, we generally oppose proposals that require submitting severance plans and/or employment contracts for a shareholder vote prior to being negotiated by management.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>39. Submit Option Re-pricing to a Shareholder Vote (SHP)</strong></td>
<td>For</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Re-pricing underwater options reduces the incentive value of stock compensation plans and dilutes shareholder value. Consequently, we support shareholder proposals that seek to require a company to submit option re-pricing to a shareholder vote.</td>
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<td><strong>40. Submit Survivor Benefit Compensation Plan to Shareholder Vote (SHP)</strong></td>
<td>For</td>
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<tr>
<td>Survivor benefit compensation plans, or “golden coffins”, can require a company to make substantial payments or awards to a senior executive’s beneficiaries following the death of the senior executive. The compensation can take the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards. This compensation would not include compensation that the senior executive chooses to defer during his or her lifetime. We recognize that offering generous compensation packages that are triggered by the passing of senior executives may help attract qualified officers. However, such compensation packages cannot be so excessive that they are unfair to shareholders or make the company unattractive to potential bidders, thereby serving as a constructive anti-takeover mechanism.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3.3 Capital Changes and Anti-Takeover Proposals</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>41. Amend Exclusive Forum Bylaw (SHP)</strong></td>
<td>Against</td>
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<tr>
<td>We will generally oppose proposals that ask the board to repeal the company’s exclusive forum bylaw. Such bylaws require certain legal action against the company to take place in the state of the company’s incorporation. The courts within the state of incorporation are considered best suited to interpret that state’s laws.</td>
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<td><strong>42. Amend Net Operating Loss (“NOL”) Rights Plans</strong></td>
<td>For</td>
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<td>NOL Rights Plans are established to protect a company’s net operating loss carry forwards and tax credits, which can be used to offset future income. We believe this is a reasonable strategy for a company to employ. Accordingly, we will vote in favor of NOL Rights Plans unless we believe the terms of the NOL Rights Plan may provide for a long-term anti-takeover device.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>43. Authorize Share Repurchase</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>We generally support share repurchase proposals that are part of a well-articulated and well-conceived capital strategy. We assess proposals to give the board unlimited authorization to repurchase shares on a case-by-case basis.</td>
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Furthermore, we would generally support the use of derivative instruments (e.g., put options and call options) as part of a share repurchase plan absent a compelling reason to the contrary. Also, absent a specific concern at the company, we will generally support a repurchase plan that could be continued during a takeover period.

44. **Blank Check Preferred Stock**  
**Against**

Blank check preferred stock proposals authorize the issuance of certain preferred stock at some future point in time and allow the board to establish voting, dividend, conversion and other rights at the time of issuance. While blank check preferred stock can provide a corporation with the flexibility needed to meet changing financial conditions, it also may be used as the vehicle for implementing a “poison pill” defense or some other entrenchment device.

We are concerned that, once this stock has been authorized, shareholders have no further power to determine how or when it will be allocated. Accordingly, we generally oppose this type of proposal.

45. **Corporate Restructurings, Merger Proposals and Spin-Offs**  
**Case-by-case**

Proposals requesting shareholder approval of corporate restructurings, merger proposals and spin-offs are determined on a case-by-case basis. In evaluating these proposals and determining our votes, we are singularly focused on meeting our goal of maximizing long-term shareholder value.

46. **Elimination of Preemptive Rights**  
**Case-by-case**

Preemptive rights allow the shareholders of the company to buy newly-issued shares before they are offered to the public in order to maintain their percentage ownership. AllianceBernstein believes that, because preemptive rights are an important shareholder right, careful scrutiny must be given to management’s attempts to eliminate them. However, because preemptive rights can be prohibitively expensive to widely-held companies, the benefit of such rights will be weighed against the economic effect of maintaining them.

47. **Expensing Stock Options (SHP)**  
**For**

U.S. generally-accepted accounting principles require companies to expense stock options, as do the accounting rules in many other jurisdictions (including those jurisdictions that have adopted IFRS -- international financial reporting standards). If a company is domiciled in a jurisdiction where the accounting rules do not already require the expensing of stock options, we will support shareholder proposals requiring this practice and disclosing information about it.

48. **Fair Price Provisions**  
**Case-by-case**

A fair price provision in the company's charter or by laws is designed to ensure that each shareholder's securities will be purchased at the same price if the corporation is acquired under a plan not agreed to by the board. In most instances, the provision requires that any tender offer made by a third party must be made to all shareholders at the same price.

Fair pricing provisions attempt to prevent the “two tiered front loaded offer” where the acquirer of a company initially offers a premium for a sufficient percentage of shares of the company to gain control and subsequently makes an offer for the remaining shares at a much lower price. The remaining shareholders have no choice but to accept the offer. The two tiered approach is coercive as it compels a shareholder to sell his or her shares immediately in order to receive the higher price per share. This type of tactic has caused many states to adopt fair price provision statutes to restrict this practice.
We consider fair price provisions on a case-by-case basis. We oppose any provision where there is evidence that management intends to use the provision as an anti-takeover device as well as any provision where the shareholder vote requirement is greater than a majority of disinterested shares (i.e., shares beneficially owned by individuals other than the acquiring party).

49. Increase Authorized Common Stock

Case-by-case

In general we regard increases in authorized common stock as serving a legitimate corporate purpose when used to: implement a stock split, aid in a recapitalization or acquisition, raise needed capital for the firm, or provide for employee savings plans, stock option plans or executive compensation plans. That said, we may oppose a particular proposed increase if we consider the authorization likely to lower the share price (this would happen, for example, if the firm were proposing to use the proceeds to overpay for an acquisition, to invest in a project unlikely to earn the firm’s cost of capital, or to compensate employees well above market rates). We oppose increases in authorized common stock where there is evidence that the shares are to be used to implement a “poison pill” or another form of anti-takeover device, or if the issuance of new shares would, in our judgment, excessively dilute the value of the outstanding shares upon issuance. In addition, a satisfactory explanation of a company's intentions – going beyond the standard “general corporate purposes” – must be disclosed in the proxy statement for proposals requesting an increase of greater than 100% of the shares outstanding. We view the use of derivatives, particularly warrants, as legitimate capital-raising instruments and apply these same principles to their use as we do to the authorization of common stock. Under certain circumstances where we believe it is important for shareholders to have an opportunity to maintain their proportional ownership, we may oppose proposals requesting shareholders approve the issuance of additional shares if those shares do not include preemptive rights.

In Hong Kong, it is common for companies to request board authority to issue new shares up to 20% of outstanding share capital. The authority typically lapses after one year. We may vote against plans that do not prohibit issuing shares at a discount, taking into account whether a company has a history of doing so.

50. Issuance of Equity without Preemptive Rights

For

We are generally in favor of issuances of equity without preemptive rights of up to 30% of a company’s outstanding shares unless there is concern that the issuance will be used in a manner that could hurt shareholder value (e.g., issuing the equity at a discount from the current market price or using the equity to help create a “poison pill” mechanism).

51. Issuance of Stock with Unequal Voting Rights

Case-by-case

Unequal voting rights plans are designed to reduce the voting power of existing shareholders and concentrate a significant amount of voting power in the hands of management. In the majority of instances, they serve as an effective deterrent to takeover attempts. These structures, however, may be beneficial, allowing management to focus on longer-term value creation, which benefits all shareholders. AllianceBernstein evaluates these proposals on a case-by-case basis and takes into consideration the alignment of management incentives with appropriate performance, metrics, and the effectiveness of the company’s strategy.

52. Net Long Position Requirement

For

We support proposals that require the ownership level needed to call a special meeting to be based on the net long position of a shareholder or shareholder group. This standard ensures that a significant economic interest accompanies the voting power.
53. **Opt Out of State Anti-takeover Law (US) (SHP)**  

Case-by-case

Many states have enacted anti-takeover laws requiring an acquirer to obtain a supermajority of a company’s stock in order to exercise control. For example, under Delaware law, absent board approval, a bidder must acquire at least 85% of a company's stock before the bidder can exercise control. Such laws represent a formidable takeover defense for companies because by simply placing 15% of the stock in “friendly” hands, a company can block an otherwise successful takeover attempt that may be in the best interests of the shareholders. These statutes often allow companies to opt-out of this law with the approval of a majority of the outstanding shares.

Shareholders proposing opt out resolutions argue that these anti-takeover laws grant the board too much power to determine a matter that should be left to the shareholders. Critics of such proposals argue that opt-out provisions do not prevent takeovers but, rather, provide the board with an opportunity to negotiate a better deal for all shareholders. Because each state’s anti-takeover laws are different and must be considered in the totality of all of a company’s takeover defenses, we review these proposals on a case-by-case basis.

54. **Reincorporation**  

Case-by-case

There are many valid business reasons a corporation may choose to reincorporate in another jurisdiction. We perform a case-by-case review of such proposals, taking into consideration management’s stated reasons for the proposed move.

Careful scrutiny also will be given to proposals that seek approval to reincorporate in countries that serve as tax havens. We recognize that such provisions can help facilitate the growth of a company’s business and potentially can benefit shareholders when a company lowers its tax liability. When evaluating such proposals, we consider factors such as the location of the company’s business, the statutory protections available in the country to enforce shareholder rights and the tax consequences of the reincorporation to shareholders.

55. **Reincorporation to Another jurisdiction to Permit Majority Voting or Other Changes in Corporate Governance (SHP)**  

Case-by-case

If a shareholder proposes that a company move to a jurisdiction where majority voting (among other shareholder-friendly conditions) is permitted, we will generally oppose the move notwithstanding the fact that we favor majority voting for directors. Our rationale is that the legal costs, taxes, other expenses and other factors, such as business disruption, in almost all cases would be material and outweigh the benefit of majority voting. If, however, we should find that these costs are not material and/or do not outweigh the benefit of majority voting, we may vote in favor of this kind of proposal. We will evaluate similarly proposals that would require reincorporation in another state to accomplish other changes in corporate governance.

56. **Stock Splits**  

For

Stock splits are intended to increase the liquidity of a company’s common stock by lowering the price, thereby making the stock seem more attractive to small investors. We generally vote in favor of stock split proposals.

57. **Submit Company’s Shareholder Rights Plan to Shareholder Vote (SHP)**  

For

Most shareholder rights plans (also known as “poison pills”) permit the shareholders of a target company involved in a hostile takeover to acquire shares of the target company, the acquiring company, or both, at a substantial discount once a “triggering event” occurs. A triggering event is usually a hostile tender offer or the acquisition by an outside
party of a certain percentage of the target company's stock. Because most plans exclude the hostile bidder from the purchase, the effect in most instances is to dilute the equity interest and the voting rights of the potential acquirer once the plan is triggered. A shareholder rights plan is designed to discourage potential acquirers from acquiring shares to make a bid for the issuer. We believe that measures that impede takeovers or entrench management not only infringe on the rights of shareholders but also may have a detrimental effect on the value of the company.

We support shareholder proposals that seek to require the company to submit a shareholder rights plan to a shareholder vote. We evaluate on a case-by-case basis proposals to implement or eliminate a shareholder rights plan.

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<tr>
<th>58. Transferrable Stock Options</th>
<th>Case-by-case</th>
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In cases where a compensation plan includes a transferable stock option program, we will consider the plan on a case-by-case basis.

These programs allow stock options to be transferred to third parties in exchange for cash or stock. In effect, management becomes insulated from the downside risk of holding a stock option, while the ordinary shareholder remains exposed to downside risk. This insulation may unacceptably remove management’s exposure to downside risk, which significantly misaligns management and shareholder interests. Accordingly, we generally vote against these programs if the transfer can be executed without shareholder approval, is available to executive officers or non-employee directors, or we consider the available disclosure relating to the mechanics and structure of the program to be insufficient to determine the costs, benefits and key terms of the program.

3.4 Auditor Proposals

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<th>59. Appointment of Auditors</th>
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We believe that the company is in the best position to choose its accounting firm, and we generally support management's recommendation.

We recognize that there may be inherent conflicts when a company’s independent auditors perform substantial non-audit related services for the company. Therefore, in reviewing a proposed auditor, we will consider the amount of fees paid for non-audit related services performed compared to the total audit fees paid by the company to the auditing firm, and whether there are any other reasons for us to question the independence or performance of the firm’s auditor. We generally will deem as excessive the non-audit fees paid by a company to its auditor if those fees account for 50% or more of total fees paid. The UK market is an exception where 100% is the threshold due to market demanded auditing. Under these circumstances, we generally vote against the auditor and the directors, in particular the members of the company’s audit committee. In addition, we generally vote against authorizing the audit committee to set the remuneration of such auditors. We exclude from this analysis non-audit fees related to IPOs, bankruptcy emergence, and spin-offs and other extraordinary events. We may abstain due to a lack of disclosure of who the auditor is.

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<th>60. Approval of Financial Statements</th>
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In some markets, companies are required to submit their financial statements for shareholder approval. This is generally a routine item and, as such, we will vote for the approval of financial statements unless there are appropriate reasons to vote otherwise. We may abstain if the information is not available in advance of the meeting.
61. Approval of Internal Statutory Auditors

Some markets (e.g., Japan) require the annual election of internal statutory auditors. Internal statutory auditors have a number of duties, including supervising management, ensuring compliance with the articles of association and reporting to a company’s board on certain financial issues. In most cases, the election of internal statutory auditors is a routine item and we will support management’s nominee provided that the nominee meets the regulatory requirements for serving as internal statutory auditors. However, we may vote against nominees who are designated independent statutory auditors who serve as executives of a subsidiary or affiliate of the issuer or if there are other reasons to question the independence of the nominees.

62. Limit Compensation Consultant Services (SHP)

These proposals seek to restrict a company from engaging a consultant retained to advise the board on compensation matters to provide the company with other services other than compensation consulting if such consultant already has been engaged to provide compensation consulting.

In February 2010, the SEC adopted final rules regarding disclosure enhancements in proxy statements and Forms 10-K. One such rule requires disclosure of the fees paid to compensation consultants and their affiliates if they provide consulting services relating to executive officer compensation and additional services, if the cost of such additional services exceeds $120,000. The rule does not, however, restrict a company from acquiring both kinds of services from a compensation consultant.

We agree with the SEC that companies should be required to disclose payments exceeding $120,000 to compensation consultants for services other than executive compensation consulting services, and we do not believe company boards should be subject to any additional restrictions or requirements. Accordingly, we oppose these proposals.

We generally apply these principles for non-US companies as well.

63. Limitation of Liability of External Statutory Auditors (Japan)

In Japan, companies may limit the liability of external statutory auditors in the event of a shareholder lawsuit through any of three mechanisms: (i) submitting the proposed limits to shareholder vote; (ii) setting limits by modifying the company’s articles of incorporation; and (iii) setting limits in contracts with outside directors, outside statutory auditors and external audit firms (requires a modification to the company’s articles of incorporation). A vote by 3% or more of shareholders can nullify a limit set through the second mechanism. The third mechanism has historically been the most prevalent.

We review proposals to set limits on auditor liability on a case-by-case basis, considering whether such a provision is necessary to secure appointment and whether it helps to maximize long-term shareholder value.

64. Separating Auditors and Consultants (SHP)

We believe that a company serves its shareholders’ interests by avoiding potential conflicts of interest that might interfere with an auditor’s independent judgment. SEC rules adopted as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 attempted to address these concerns by prohibiting certain services by a company’s independent auditors and requiring additional disclosure of others services.
We evaluate on a case-by-case basis proposals that go beyond the SEC rules or other local market standards by prohibiting auditors from performing other non-audit services or calling for the board to adopt a policy to ensure auditor independence.

We take into consideration the policies and procedures the company already has in place to ensure auditor independence and non-audit fees as a percentage of total fees paid to the auditor are not excessive.

**3.5 Shareholder Access and Voting Proposals**

### 65. A Shareholder’s Right to Call Special Meetings (SHP)  Case-by-case

Most state corporation statutes (though not Delaware, where many U.S. issuers are domiciled) allow shareholders to call a special meeting when they want to take action on certain matters that arise between regularly-scheduled annual meetings. This right may apply only if a shareholder, or a group of shareholders, owns a specified percentage of the outstanding shares. (Ten percent is common among states, although one state sets the threshold as high as forty percent.)

We recognize the importance of the right of shareholders to remove poorly-performing directors, respond to takeover offers and take other actions without having to wait for the next annual meeting. However, we also believe it is important to protect companies and shareholders from nuisance proposals. We further believe that striking a balance between these competing interests will maximize shareholder value. Accordingly, we will generally support a proposal to call a special meeting if the proposing shareholder owns, or the proposing shareholders as a group own, 10% or more of the outstanding voting equity of the company.

From time to time we may receive requests to join with other shareholders for purposes of meeting an ownership requirement necessary to call a special meeting. Similarly, we may receive other requests to join a voting block for purposes of influencing management. If the third parties requesting our participation are not affiliated with us and have no business relationships with us, we will consider the request on a case-by-case basis. However, where the requesting party has a business relationship with us (e.g., the requesting party is a client or a significant service provider), agreeing to such a request may pose a potential conflict of interest. As a fiduciary we have an obligation to vote proxies in the best interest of our clients (without regard to our own interests in generating and maintaining business with our other clients) and given our desire to avoid even the appearance of a conflict, we will generally decline such a request.

### 66. Adopt Cumulative Voting (SHP)  Case-by-case

Cumulative voting is a method of electing directors that enables each shareholder to multiply the number of his or her shares by the number of directors being considered. A shareholder may then cast the total votes for any one director or a selected group of directors. For example, a holder of 10 shares normally casts 10 votes for each of 12 nominees to the board thus giving the shareholder 120 (10 x 12) votes. Under cumulative voting, the shareholder may cast all 120 votes for a single nominee, 60 for two, 40 for three, or any other combination that the shareholder may choose.

We believe that encouraging activism among shareholders generally is beneficial to shareholders and helps maximize shareholder value. Cumulative voting supports the interests of minority shareholders in contested elections by enabling them to concentrate their votes and dramatically increase their chances of electing a dissident director to a board. Accordingly, we generally will support shareholder proposals to restore or provide for cumulative voting and we generally will oppose management proposals to eliminate cumulative voting. However, we may oppose cumulative voting if a company has in place both proxy access, which allows shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot, and majority voting (with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more
nominees than seats), which requires each director to receive the affirmative vote of a majority of votes cast and, we believe, leads to greater director accountability to shareholders.

Also, we support cumulative voting at controlled companies regardless of any other shareholder protections that may be in place.

67. Adopt Cumulative Voting in Dual Shareholder Class Structures (SHP)  
For

In dual class structures (such as A&B shares) where the shareholders with a majority economic interest have a minority voting interest, we generally vote in favor of cumulative voting for those shareholders.

68. Early Disclosure of Voting Results (SHP)  
Against

These proposals seek to require a company to disclose votes sooner than is required by the local market. In the US, the SEC requires disclosure in the first periodic report filed after the company’s annual meeting which we believe is reasonable. We do not support requests that require disclosure earlier than the time required by the local regulator.

69. Implement Confidential Voting (SHP)  
For

Proponents of confidential voting argue that proxy voting should be conducted under the same rules of confidentiality as voting in political and other elections (by secret ballot), with an independent party verifying the results. They also argue that open balloting allows management to re-solicit shareholders and to urge--or sometimes coerce--them into changing their votes. Opponents argue that confidential voting makes it more difficult for a company to garner the necessary votes to conduct business (especially where a supermajority vote is required) because proxy solicitors cannot determine how individual shareholders voted.

We support confidential voting before the actual vote has been cast, because we believe that voting on shareholder matters should be free of any potential for coercion or undue influence from the company or other interested parties.

70. Limiting a Shareholder’s Right to Call Special Meetings  
Against

Companies contend that limitations on shareholders’ rights to call special meetings are needed to prevent minority shareholders from taking control of the company's agenda. However, such limits also have anti-takeover implications because they prevent a shareholder or a group of shareholders who have acquired a significant stake in the company from forcing management to address urgent issues, such as the potential sale of the company. Because most states prohibit shareholders from abusing this right, we see no justifiable reason for management to eliminate this fundamental shareholder right. Accordingly, we generally will vote against such proposals.

In addition, if the board of directors, without shareholder consent, raises the ownership threshold a shareholder must reach before the shareholder can call a special meeting, we will vote against those directors.

71. Permit a Shareholder’s Right to Act by Written Consent (SHP)  
For

Action by written consent enables a large shareholder or group of shareholders to initiate votes on corporate matters prior to the annual meeting. We believe this is a fundamental shareholder right and, accordingly, will support shareholder proposals seeking to restore this right. However, in cases where a company has a majority shareholder or group of related majority shareholders with majority economic interest, we will oppose proposals seeking to restore this right as there is a potential risk of abuse by the majority shareholder or group of majority shareholders.
72. Proxy Access for Annual Meetings (SHP)

These proposals ask companies to give shareholders equal access to proxy materials in order to express their views on various proxy issues.

Management often argues that shareholders already have significant access to the proxy as provided by law (i.e., the right to have shareholder proposals included in the proxy statement and the right to suggest director candidates to the nominating committee). Management also argues that it would be unworkable to open the proxy process because of the large number of shareholders who might wish to comment and because it would be impossible to screen out “nuisance” proposals.

We have voted in favor of certain resolutions calling for enhancement of shareholders’ ability to access proxy materials to increase corporate boards’ attention to shareholder concerns. While we recognize that access must be limited in order to discourage frivolous proposals and those put forward by shareholders who may not have the best interests of all shareholders in mind, we believe that shareholders should have a meaningful ability to exercise their rights to vote for and nominate directors of the companies in which they invest.

To this end, in the United States we supported SEC proxy reform in 2003 and 2007, and we supported the SEC’s proposed proxy reform in 2009 intended to solve the problem of shareholders’ limited ability to exercise their rights to nominate directors and have the nominations disclosed to and considered by shareholders. In 2010, the SEC adopted new rules requiring companies to include the nominees of “significant, long-term shareholders” in their proxy materials, alongside the nominees of management. Under the rules, shareholders are deemed “significant and long-term” if they own at least three percent of the company’s shares continuously for at least the prior three years. However, in July 2011, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the SEC’s 2010 rules (Exchange Act Rule 14a-11), finding that, in adopting the rule, the SEC violated the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to adequately consider the rule’s effect on efficiency, competition and capital formation. We continue to monitor the situation.

From time to time we may receive requests to join with other shareholders to support a shareholder action. We may, for example, receive requests to join a voting block for purposes of influencing management. If the third parties requesting our participation are not affiliated with us and have no business relationships with us, we will consider the request on a case-by-case basis. However, where the requesting party has a business relationship with us (e.g., the requesting party is a client or a significant service provider), agreeing to such a request may pose a potential conflict of interest. As a fiduciary we have an obligation to vote proxies in the best interest of our clients (without regard to our own interests in generating and maintaining business with our other clients) and given our desire to avoid even the appearance of a conflict, we will generally decline such a request.

73. Reduce Meeting Notification from 21 Days to 14 Days (U.K.)

Companies in the United Kingdom may, with shareholder approval, reduce the notice period for extraordinary general meetings from 21 days to 14 days.

A reduced notice period expedites the process of obtaining shareholder approval of additional financing needs and other important matters. Accordingly, we support these proposals.

74. Rotation of Locale for Annual Meeting (SHP)

Proponents contend that the site of the annual meeting should be moved each year to a different locale in order to allow as many shareholders as possible to attend the annual meeting. Conversely, we believe the location of a company’s annual meeting is best left to the discretion of management, unless there is evidence that the location of
previous meetings was specifically chosen with the intention of making it more difficult for shareholders to participate in the meeting. Consequently, we generally oppose proposals calling for the locale of the annual meeting to rotate.

75. **Shareholder Proponent Engagement Process (SHP)**

   **For**

   We believe that proper corporate governance requires that proposals receiving support from a majority of shareholders be considered and implemented by the company. Accordingly, we support establishing an engagement process between shareholders and management to ensure proponents of majority-supported proposals, have an established means of communicating with management.

76. **Supermajority Vote Requirements**

   **Against**

   A supermajority vote requirement is a charter or by-law requirement that, when implemented, raises the percentage (higher than the customary simple majority) of shareholder votes needed to approve certain proposals, such as mergers, changes of control, or proposals to amend or repeal a portion of the Articles of Incorporation.

   In most instances, we oppose these proposals and support shareholder proposals that seek to reinstate the simple majority vote requirement.

3.6 **Environmental, Social and Disclosure Proposals**

77. **Adopt a Special Corporate Policy for SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Other Trading Plans (US) (SHP)**

   **Against**

   These shareholder proposals ask a company to adopt a special policy for trading by senior executives in addition to the requirements of SEC Rule 10b5-1 and other trading plans that govern their trading. Subject to the history of the company and any record of abuses, we are generally against requiring a company to adopt additional requirements.

78. **Adopt Guidelines for Country Selection (SHP)**

   **Case-by-case**

   These proposals seek to require a company to prepare a special report on how it selects the countries in which it operates. We will evaluate whether sufficient information about why a company operates in various jurisdictions is provided in annual reports and other company documents.

79. **Amend EEO Statement to Include a Reference to Sexual Orientation (US) (SHP)**

   **For**

   We support proposals requiring a company to amend its Equal Employment Opportunity policies to specifically reference sexual orientation.

80. **Animal Testing (SHP)**

   **Case-by-case**

   Proposals requiring companies to reduce reliance on animals for consumer product safety testing will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account practicality and business impact. Proposals requiring increased disclosure on the numbers of animals tested, the types of animals used and the types of tests performed will be generally voted in favor, while carefully considering any policies that are already in place at the company, and to what extent such policies meet the national standards.
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<tr>
<th>81. Anti-Greenmail Proposal (SHP)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Greenmail Proposal (SHP)</td>
<td>For</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greenmails, commonly referred to as “legal corporate blackmail,” are payments made to a potential hostile acquirer who has accumulated a significant percentage of a company's stock. The company acquires the raider's stock at a premium in exchange for an agreement that the raider will not attempt to acquire control for a certain number of years. This practice discriminates against all other shareholders as only the hostile party receives payment, which is usually at a substantial premium over the market value of its shares. Anti-greenmail proposals seek to prevent greenmail by adopting amendments to the company’s charter or by-laws that limit the ability of that company’s board to acquire blocks of another company's stock at above-market prices.</td>
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<td>We vote in favor of an anti-greenmail proposal, provided the proposal has no other management initiated anti-takeover features.</td>
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<tr>
<th>82. Charitable Contributions (SHP)</th>
<th>Case-by-case</th>
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<tr>
<td>Charitable Contributions (SHP)</td>
<td>Case-by-case</td>
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<tr>
<td>We generally support shareholder proposals relating to reporting charitable contributions. We will evaluate proposals seeking to restrict charitable contributions on a case-by-case basis. Proponents of such proposals argue that charitable contributions are an inappropriate use of company assets because the purpose of any corporation is to make a profit. Opponents argue that charitable contributions are a useful means for a company to create goodwill.</td>
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<th>83. Genetically Altered or Engineered Food (SHP)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Genetically Altered or Engineered Food (SHP)</td>
<td>Case-by-case</td>
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<tr>
<td>These proposals seek to require companies to label genetically modified organisms in a company’s products or in some cases completely eliminate their use. Proponents argue that such measures should be required due to the possible health and safety issues surrounding the use of such products. Opponents point out that the use of such products helps improve crop yield, and implementing such proposals could have immediate negative economic effects on the company.</td>
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<th>84. Global Labor Standards (SHP)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Labor Standards (SHP)</td>
<td>For</td>
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<tr>
<td>These proposals ask companies to issue reports on their corporate standards for doing business abroad and to adopt mechanisms for ensuring vendor compliance with these standards. The standards include policies to ensure that workers are paid sustainable living wages and children are not used as forced labor. Generally, we vote in favor, but we carefully consider any policies that are already in place at the company, to what extent such policies meet the standards espoused by the International Labor Organization’s Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (and other relevant ILO conventions), and any evidence of prior abuse by the company. We will also ensure the practicality of such proposals.</td>
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<th>85. Global Warming; Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (SHP)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Global Warming; Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions (SHP)</td>
<td>Case-by-case</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proposals addressing environmental and energy concerns are plentiful. We will generally support proposals requesting greater disclosure, but proposals seeking to adopt specific emissions or environmental goals or metrics will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Topics can range from general environmental reports to more specific reports on topics such as greenhouse gas emissions, the release of radioactive materials, and the generation or use of nuclear energy. The scope of the requested reports or policies can also vary. Proponents of these proposals may seek information on the steps the company has taken to address the environmental concern in question, or they may also</td>
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ask the company to detail any financial risk associated with environmental issues. Opponents of these proposals claim that complying with proponents’ requests would be overly costly for, or unduly burdensome on, the company.

86. **Implement the MacBride Principles (Northern Ireland) (SHP)** Case-by-case

The MacBride Principles aim to fight discriminatory anti Catholic employment practices in the British state of Northern Ireland. The Principles encourage U.S. companies to actively recruit Catholic employees and, where possible, groom them for management responsibilities. Companies are also asked to ensure job security for their Catholic employees and to abolish the use of inflammatory religious emblems.

Supporters argue that the MacBride Principles effectively address Northern Ireland’s inequalities in employment (in Northern Ireland, unemployment among Catholic men is twice as high as among Protestant men). Opponents contend that the adoption of the MacBride Principles is itself a form of reverse discrimination, which may violate British law. The British government is concerned that adoption of the MacBride Principles may increase the “hassle factor” of doing business in the economically troubled area and reduce the attractiveness of investments.

87. **Include Sustainability as a Performance Measure (SHP)** Case-by-case

We believe management and directors should be given latitude in determining appropriate performance measurements. Therefore, we will evaluate on a case-by-case basis proposals requesting companies to consider incorporating specific, measurable, practical goals consisting of sustainability principles and environmental impacts as metrics for incentive compensation.

88. **Military Issues (SHP)** Case-by-case

These proposals ask companies involved in military production to report on future plans and to diversify or convert to the production of civilian goods and services. Opponents of these resolutions are concerned that conversion is not economically rational, and view the proposals as intrusions into management’s decision making prerogative. Opponents also point to the imperative of a strong defense as reason enough to continue military production.

89. **Nuclear Waste Disposal (SHP)** Case-by-case

These resolutions ask companies to allocate a portion of the cost of building nuclear power plants for research into nuclear waste disposal. Proponents argue that, because the life span of certain waste byproducts exceeds current containment capabilities, the industry should concentrate more on waste management and disposal. While opponents acknowledge the need for research, they contend that the problem is overstated, and that some suggested containment programs are unnecessarily expensive.

90. **Other Business** Against

In certain jurisdictions, these proposals allow management to act on issues that shareholders may raise at the annual meeting. Because it is impossible to know what issues may be raised, we will vote against these proposals.

91. **Pharmaceutical Pricing (US) (SHP)** Case-by-case

These proposals seek to require a company to implement pricing restraints to make prescription drugs more affordable, both domestically and in third-world countries. Proponents argue that drug prices in the United States,
considered to be among the highest in the world, make adequate medical care inaccessible to those other than the most affluent. Critics of such proposals argue that artificial price controls would reduce revenues, deter investors and ultimately reduce funds available for future research and development.

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<td><strong>92.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Plant Closings (US) (SHP)</strong></td>
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<td>These proposals ask companies to create or expand programs to relocate workers displaced by a plant closing. Supporters of plant closing resolutions argue management should be more sensitive to employees both during the decision on closing a plant and in efforts at relocation. Companies generally respond that they already have programs to accommodate displaced workers. In addition, federal law now requires 60 days’ advance notice of a major plant closing or layoff and a number of states also have applicable regulations.</td>
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<td><strong>93.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reimbursement of Shareholder Proposal Expenses (SHP)</strong></td>
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<td>These shareholder proposals would require companies to reimburse the expenses of shareholders who submit proposals that receive a majority of votes cast. We generally vote against these proposals.</td>
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<td><strong>94.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Report on Pay Disparity (SHP)</strong></td>
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<td>A report on pay disparity compares the total compensation of a company’s executive officers with that of the company’s lowest paid workers, including statistics and rationale pertaining to changes in the size of the gap, information on whether executive compensation is “excessive”, and information on whether greater oversight is needed over certain aspects of the company’s compensation policies. Proponents may note that executive compensation, in general, and the gap between executive compensation and the pay of a company’s lowest paid employees, has grown significantly in recent years. They may also note that the gap between executive salary and the wage of the average employee at the company is significantly higher.</td>
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<td><strong>95.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Report on Water Pollution Prevention Measures (SHP)</strong></td>
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<td>We will generally support proposals requesting a company report to shareholders on measures taken by the company to prevent runoff, wastewater and other forms of water pollution from the company’s own (and its contractors’) facilities, taking into account national legislation and practicality.</td>
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<td><strong>96.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Report on Workplace Diversity and/or Employment Policies (SHP)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Equal employment may refer to the right to be free from discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, age or disability in the work force. Resolutions generally ask companies to report progress in complying with affirmative action laws. In assessing these proposals, we carefully consider any policies that are already in place at the company. However, we will also assure the practicality of such proposals.</td>
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<td><strong>97.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reporting Political Contributions; Lobbying Expenses (SHP)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>We generally vote in favor of proposals requesting increased disclosure of political contributions and lobbying expenses. By requiring reports to shareholders, proponents of these shareholder resolutions contend investors can help police wrongdoings in the political system and better evaluate the use of company resources. Critics of these</td>
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proposals contend that reformers overstate the problem and that a company should play an active role in expressing its opinion about relevant legislation.

98. **Submit Political Spending Program to Shareholder Advisory Vote (SHP)**  
We generally vote against shareholder proposals requiring the board of directors to adopt a policy to provide shareholders with the opportunity to ratify a company’s political spending program. We believe such proposals are overly intrusive on management’s discretion.

99. **Sustainability Report (SHP)**  
We generally support shareholder proposals calling for a sustainability report while taking into account the current reporting policies of the company as they relate to sustainability and whether having a report provides added benefits to shareholders.

Sustainability is a business model that requires companies to balance the needs and interests of various stakeholders while concurrently sustaining their business, communities and the environment for future generations. Although many argue that the sustainable development concept is constantly evolving, core issues continue to revolve around ensuring the rights of future generations, adopting a long-term approach to business problems and strengthening the connections between the environment, society and the economy. This “triple bottom line” can be used as a framework for measuring and reporting corporate performance against economic, social and environmental parameters. However, the term can also encompass a set of values, issues and practices that companies must address in order to minimize harm, while simultaneously creating economic, social and environmental value. We evaluate these proposals on a case-by-case basis.

Proponents of these proposals argue that investors are justified in seeking additional disclosure on companies’ social and environmental performance because they affect shareholder value. Opponents argue that companies already include much of the information contained in a sustainability report in workplace policies and/or codes of ethics and post this information on their websites; supporting these proposals would therefore be unduly burdensome.

100. **The CERES Principles (SHP)**  
Many environmental proposals include a recommendation that companies adopt and report their compliance with the Coalition of Environmentally Responsible Economies (the “CERES” Principles). The CERES Principles are a set of ten principles committing the company to environmental improvement. Proponents argue that endorsement of the CERES principles gives a company greater public credibility than standards created by industry or government regulation alone. Companies argue that implementing the CERES Principles only duplicates their current environmental policies and is unduly burdensome.

101. **Tobacco (SHP)**  
Proposals relating to tobacco issues are wide-ranging. They include proposals to have a company issue warnings on the environmental risks of tobacco smoke and the risks of smoking-related diseases, as well as proposals to link executive compensation with reductions in teen smoking.

   a. **End Production of Tobacco Products**  
   Against
These proposals seek to phase-out all production, promotion and marketing of tobacco products by a specified date. Proponents argue that tobacco companies have acknowledged the serious health risks related to smoking cigarettes yet they continue to distribute them. When evaluating these resolutions, we must consider the company’s risks and liabilities associated with those lines of business, and evaluate the overall strategic business plans and how those plans will serve to maximize long-term shareholder value.

Because phasing out all tobacco-related operations by a tobacco company is very likely to result in the end of the company, which clearly is not in the best interests of shareholders, we will generally oppose these proposals.

b. Spin-off Tobacco-related Business Case-by-case

The motivation for these proposals is generally in line with what we have described immediately above -- proponents seek for the subject company to phase-out all production, promotion and marketing of tobacco products by a specified date, citing health risks and tobacco companies’ systemic failure to honestly inform the public about these health risks until recently. The key difference is that, unlike the above type of proposal, which would be put to a company that derives most, if not all, of its revenues from tobacco-related operations, a spin-off proposal would request that a company that derives only a portion (often a substantial portion) of its revenues from tobacco-related operations spin-off its tobacco-related operating segment / subsidiary.

When evaluating resolutions requesting a company divest itself from one or more lines of business, we must consider the company’s risks and liabilities associated with those lines of business, evaluate the overall strategic business plans and determine how those plans will serve to maximize long-term shareholder value
4. Conflicts of Interest

4.1 Introduction

As a fiduciary, we always must act in our clients’ best interests. We strive to avoid even the appearance of a conflict that may compromise the trust our clients have placed in us, and we insist on strict adherence to fiduciary standards and compliance with all applicable federal and state securities laws. We have adopted a comprehensive Code of Business Conduct and Ethics ("Code") to help us meet these obligations. As part of this responsibility and as expressed throughout the Code, we place the interests of our clients first and attempt to avoid any perceived or actual conflicts of interest.

We recognize that there may be a potential material conflict of interest when we vote a proxy solicited by an issuer whose retirement plan we manage, or we administer, who distributes AllianceBernstein-sponsored mutual funds, or with whom we or an employee has another business or personal relationship that may affect how we vote on the issuer’s proxy. Similarly, we may have a potential material conflict of interest when deciding how to vote on a proposal sponsored or supported by a shareholder group that is a client. In order to avoid any perceived or actual conflict of interest, the procedures set forth below in sections 3.2 through 3.7 have been established for use when we encounter a potential conflict to ensure that our voting decisions are based on our clients’ best interests and are not the product of a conflict.

4.2 Adherence to Stated Proxy Voting Policies

Votes generally are cast in accordance with this policy. In situations where our policy is case-by-case, this Manual often provides criteria that will guide our decision. In situations where our policy on a particular issue is case-by-case and the vote cannot be clearly decided by an application of our stated policy, a member of the Proxy Committee or his/her designee will make the voting decision in accordance with the basic principle of our policy to vote proxies with the intention of maximizing the value of the securities in our client accounts. In these situations, the voting rationale must be documented either on the voting platform of ISS, by retaining relevant emails or another appropriate method. Where appropriate, the views of investment professionals are considered. All votes cast contrary to our stated voting policy on specific issues must be documented. On an annual basis, the Proxy Committee will receive a report of all such votes so as to confirm adherence of the policy.

4.3 Disclosure of Conflicts

When considering a proxy proposal, members of the Proxy Committee or investment professionals involved in the decision-making process must disclose to the Proxy Committee any potential conflict (including personal relationships) of which they are aware and any substantive contact that they have had with any interested outside party (including the issuer or shareholder group sponsoring a proposal) regarding the proposal. Any previously unknown conflict will be recorded on the Potential Conflicts List (discussed below). If a member of the Proxy Committee has a conflict of interest, he or she must also remove himself or herself from the decision-making process.

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3 From time to time a client may request that we vote their proxies consistent with AFL-CIO guidelines or the policy of the National Association of Pension Funds. In those situations, AllianceBernstein reserves the right to depart from those policies if we believe it to be in the client’s best interests.
4.4 Potential Conflicts List

No less frequently than annually, a list of companies and organizations whose proxies may pose potential conflicts of interest is compiled by the Legal and Compliance Department (the “Potential Conflicts List”). The Potential Conflicts List includes:

- Publicly-traded Clients from the Russell 3000 Index, the Morgan Stanley Capital International (“MSCI”) Europe Australia Far East Index (MSCI EAFE), the MSCI Canada Index and the MSCI Emerging Markets Index;
- Publicly-traded companies that distribute AllianceBernstein mutual funds;
- Bernstein private clients who are directors, officers or 10% shareholders of publicly traded companies;
- Clients who sponsor, publicly support or have material interest in a proposal upon which we will be eligible to vote;
- Publicly-traded affiliated companies;
- Companies where an employee of AllianceBernstein or AXA Financial has identified an interest;
- Any other conflict of which a Proxy Committee member becomes aware.

We determine our votes for all meetings of companies on the Potential Conflicts List by applying the tests described in Section 3.6 below. We document all instances when the independent compliance officer determines our vote.

4.5 Determine Existence of Conflict of Interest

When we encounter a potential conflict of interest, we review our proposed vote using the following analysis to ensure our voting decision does not generate a conflict of interest:

- If our proposed vote is consistent with our Proxy Voting Policy, no further review is necessary.
- If our proposed vote is contrary to our Proxy Voting Policy and our client’s position on the proposal, no further review is necessary.
- If our proposed vote is contrary to our Proxy Voting Policy or is not covered herein, is consistent with our client’s position, and is also consistent with the views of ISS, no further review is necessary.
- If our proposed vote is contrary to our Proxy Voting Policy or is not covered herein, is consistent with our client’s position and is contrary to the views of ISS, the vote will be presented to an independent compliance officer (“ICO”). The ICO will determine whether the proposed vote is reasonable. If the ICO cannot determine that the proposed vote is reasonable, the ICO may instruct AllianceBernstein to refer the votes back to the client(s) or take other actions as the ICO deems appropriate. The ICO’s review will be documented using a Proxy Voting Conflict of Interest Form (a copy of which is attached hereto).

4.6 Review of Third Party Research Service Conflicts of Interest

We consider the research of ISS, so the Proxy Committee takes reasonable steps to verify that ISS is, in fact, independent based on all of the relevant facts and circumstances. This includes reviewing ISS’s conflict management procedures on an annual basis. When reviewing these conflict management procedures, we will consider, among other things, whether ISS (i) has the capacity and competency to adequately analyze proxy issues; and (ii) can offer research in an impartial manner and in the best interests of our clients.

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4 The Proxy Committee must notify the Legal and Compliance Department promptly of any previously unknown conflict.
4.7 Confidential Voting

It is AllianceBernstein’s policy to support confidentiality before the actual vote has been cast. Employees are prohibited from revealing how we intend to vote except to (i) members of the Proxy Committee; (ii) Portfolio managers that hold the security in their managed accounts; (iii) the Research Analyst(s) who cover(s) the security; and (iv) clients, upon request, for the securities held in their portfolio. Once the votes have been cast, they are made public in accordance with mutual fund proxy vote disclosures required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and we generally post all votes to our public website the quarter after the vote has been cast.

We may participate in proxy surveys conducted by shareholder groups or consultants so long as such participation does not compromise our confidential voting policy. Specifically, prior to our required SEC disclosures each year, we may respond to surveys asking about our proxy voting policies, but not any specific votes. After our mutual fund proxy vote disclosures required by the SEC each year have been made public and/or votes have been posted to our public website, we may respond to surveys that cover specific votes in addition to our voting policies.

On occasion, clients for whom we do not have proxy voting authority may ask us for advice on proxy votes that they cast. A member of the Proxy Committee or a Proxy Manager may offer such advice subject to an understanding with the client that the advice shall remain confidential.

Any substantive contact regarding proxy issues from the issuer, the issuer’s agent or a shareholder group sponsoring a proposal must be reported to the Proxy Committee if such contact was material to a decision to vote contrary to this Policy. Routine administrative inquiries from proxy solicitors need not be reported.

4.8 A Note Regarding AllianceBernstein’s Structure

AllianceBernstein and AllianceBernstein Holding L.P. (“AB Holding”) are Delaware limited partnerships. As limited partnerships, neither company is required to produce an annual proxy statement or hold an annual shareholder meeting. In addition, the general partner of AllianceBernstein and AB Holding, AllianceBernstein Corporation, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AXA, a French holding company for an international group of insurance and related financial services companies.

As a result, most of the positions we express in this Proxy Voting Policy are inapplicable to our business. For example, although units in AB Holding are publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), the NYSE Listed Company Manual exempts limited partnerships and controlled companies from compliance with various listing requirements, including the requirement that our board have a majority of independent directors.

5. Voting Transparency

We publish our voting records on our website quarterly, 30 days after the end of the previous quarter. Many clients have requested that we provide them with periodic reports on how we voted their proxies. Clients may obtain information about how we voted proxies on their behalf by contacting their Advisor. Alternatively, clients may make a written request to the Chief Compliance Officer.

6. Recordkeeping

All of the records referenced below will be kept in an easily accessible place for at least the length of time required by local regulation and custom, and, if such local regulation requires that records are kept for less than five years from the end of the fiscal year during which the last entry was made on such record, we will follow the U.S. rule of five years. We maintain the vast majority of these records electronically. We will keep paper records, if any, in one of our offices for at least two years.
6.1 Proxy Voting Policy

The Proxy Voting Policy shall be maintained in the Legal and Compliance Department and posted on our company intranet and the AllianceBernstein website.

6.2 Proxy Statements Received Regarding Client Securities

For U.S. Securities, AllianceBernstein relies on the SEC to maintain copies of each proxy statement we receive regarding client securities. For Non-U.S. Securities, we rely on ISS, our proxy voting agent, to retain such proxy statements.

6.3 Records of Votes Cast on Behalf of Clients

Records of votes cast by AllianceBernstein are retained electronically by our proxy voting agent, ISS.

6.4 Records of Clients Requests for Proxy Voting Information

Copies of written requests from clients for information on how AllianceBernstein voted their proxies shall be maintained by the Legal and Compliance Department. Responses to written and oral requests for information on how we voted clients’ proxies will be kept in the Client Group.

6.5 Documents Prepared by AllianceBernstein that are Material to Voting Decisions

The Proxy Committee is responsible for maintaining documents prepared by the Committee or any AllianceBernstein employee that were material to a voting decision. Therefore, where an investment professional’s opinion is essential to the voting decision, the recommendation from investment professionals must be made in writing to the Proxy Manager.

7. Proxy Voting Procedures

7.1 Vote Administration

In an effort to increase the efficiency of voting proxies, AllianceBernstein uses ISS to act as its voting agent for our clients’ holdings globally.

Issuers initially send proxy information to the custodians of our client accounts. We instruct these custodian banks to direct proxy related materials to ISS’s offices. ISS provides us with research related to each resolution. A Proxy Manager reviews the ballots via ISS’s web platform, ProxyExchange (For separately managed account programs, Proxy Managers use Broadridge’s ProxyEdge platform.). Using ProxyExchange (or ProxyEdge), the Proxy Manager submits our voting decision. ISS (or Broadridge) then returns the proxy ballot forms to the designated returnee for tabulation. Clients may request that, when voting their proxies, we utilize an ISS recommendation or ISS’s Taft-Hartley Voting Policy.

If necessary, any paper ballots we receive will be voted online using ProxyVote or via mail or fax.

7.2 Share blocking

Proxy voting in certain countries requires “share blocking.” Shareholders wishing to vote their proxies must deposit their shares shortly before the date of the meeting (usually one week) with a designated depositary.

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5 U.S. securities are defined as securities of issuers required to make reports pursuant to §12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Non-U.S. securities are defined as all other securities.
During this blocking period, shares that will be voted at the meeting cannot be sold until the meeting has taken place and the shares are returned to the clients’ custodian banks. We may determine that the value of exercising the vote is outweighed by the detriment of not being able to sell the shares during this period. In cases where we want to retain the ability to trade shares, we may abstain from voting those shares.

We seek to vote all proxies for securities held in client accounts for which we have proxy voting authority. However, in some markets administrative issues beyond our control may sometimes prevent us from voting such proxies. For example, we may receive meeting notices after the cut-off date for voting or without enough time to fully consider the proxy. Similarly, proxy materials for some issuers may not contain disclosure sufficient to arrive at a voting decision, in which cases we may abstain from voting. Some markets outside the U.S. require periodic renewals of powers of attorney that local agents must have from our clients prior to implementing our voting instructions.

7.3 Loaned Securities

Many of our clients have entered into securities lending arrangements with agent lenders to generate additional revenue. We will not be able to vote securities that are on loan under these types of arrangements. However, under rare circumstances, for voting issues that may have a significant impact on the investment, we may request that clients or custodians recall securities that are on loan if we determine that the benefit of voting outweighs the costs and lost revenue to the client or fund and the administrative burden of retrieving the securities.
EXHIBIT

PROXY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
# Proxy Voting Guideline Summary

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<tr>
<td>Submit Option Re-pricing to a Shareholder Vote</td>
<td></td>
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<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit Survivor Benefit Compensation Plans to a Shareholder Vote</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Capital Changes and Anti-Take Over Proposals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shareholder Proposal</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amend Exclusive Forum Bylaw</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amend Net Operating Loss (“NOL”) Rights Plans</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorize Share Repurchase</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank Check Preferred Stock</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Restructurings, Merger Proposals and Spin-offs</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder Proposal</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Against</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elimination of Preemptive Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✅ Expensing Stock Options</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Price Provisions</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Authorized Common Stock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issuance of Equity without Preemptive Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issuance of Stock with Unequal Voting Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Long Position Requirement</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✅ Opt Out of State Anti-takeover Law (US)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reincorporation</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✅ Reincorporation to Another jurisdiction to Permit Majority Voting or Other Changes in Corporate Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock Splits</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✅ Submit Company’s Shareholder Rights Plan to a Shareholder Vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Transferrable Stock Options</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Auditor Proposals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Auditor Proposals</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appointment of Auditors</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of Financial Statements</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of Internal Statutory Auditors</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✅ Limit Compensation Consultant Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitation of Liability of External Statutory Auditors (Japan)</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✅ Separating Auditors and Consultants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Shareholder Access & Voting Proposals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shareholder Access &amp; Voting Proposals</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✅ A Shareholder’s Right to Call Special Meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✅ Adopt Cumulative Voting</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>✅ Adopt Cumulative Voting in Dual Shareholder Class Structures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>✅ Early Disclosure of Voting Results</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✅ Implement Confidential Voting</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder Proposal</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Against</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limiting a Shareholder’s Right to Call Special Meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permit a Shareholder’s Right to Act by Written Consent</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proxy Access for Annual Meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reduce Meeting Notification from 21 Days to 14 Days (U.K.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rotation of Locale for Annual Meeting</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shareholder Proponent Engagement Process</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supermajority Vote Requirements</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental &amp; Social, Disclosure Proposals</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Adopt a Special Corporate Policy for SEC Rule 1b5-1 and Other Trading Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adopt Guidelines for Country Selection</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Amend EEO Statement to Include a Reference to Sexual Orientation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Animal Testing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Greenmail Proposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charitable Contributions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Genetically Altered or Engineered Food</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Labor Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Warming; Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implement the MacBride Principles (Northern Ireland)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Include Sustainability as a Performance Measure</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear Waste Disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Business</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pharmaceutical Pricing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plant Closings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reimbursement of Shareholder Proposal Expenses</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Report on Collateral in Derivatives Trading</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shareholder Proposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>√ Report on Pay Disparity</td>
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<tr>
<td>√ Report on Water Pollution Prevention Measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>√ Report on Workplace Diversity and/or Employment Policies</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>√ Reporting Political Contributions; Lobbying Expenses</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>√ Submit Political Spending Program to Shareholder Advisory Vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>√ Sustainability Report</td>
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<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>√ The CERES Principles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>√ End Production of Tobacco Products</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>√ Spin-off Tobacco-related Business</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
EXHIBIT

PROXY VOTING CONFLICT OF INTEREST FORM

Name of Security

Date of Shareholder Meeting

Short description of the conflict (client, mutual fund distributor, etc.):

1. Is our proposed vote on all issues consistent with our stated proxy voting policy?
   ☐ Yes ☐ No  
   *If yes, stop here and sign below as no further review is necessary.*

2. Is our proposed vote contrary to our client’s position?
   ☐ Yes ☐ No  
   *If yes, stop here and sign below as no further review is necessary.*

3. Is our proposed vote consistent with the views of Institutional Shareholder Services?
   ☐ Yes ☐ No  
   *If yes, stop here and sign below as no further review is necessary.*

Please attach a memo containing the following information and documentation supporting the proxy voting decision:

☐ A list of the issue(s) where our proposed vote is contrary to our stated policy (director election, cumulative voting, equity compensation plan, etc).

☐ A description of any substantive contact with any interested outside party and a proxy voting committee or an AllianceBernstein investment professional that was material to our voting decision. Please include date, attendees, titles, organization they represent and topics discussed. If there was no such contact, please note as such.

☐ If the Independent Compliance Officer has NOT determined that the proposed vote is reasonable, please explain and indicate what action has been, or will be taken.

Independent Compliance Officer Approval (if necessary. Email approval is acceptable.):

I hereby confirm that the proxy voting decision referenced on this form is reasonable.

______________________________
Prepared by:

Print Name: (___________)

Date: ____________________

Phillip Kirstein

Date: ____________________

Please return this completed form and all supporting documentation to the Conflicts Officer in the Legal and Compliance Department and keep a copy for your records.
STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT

Principles for Responsible Investment,
ESG, and Socially Responsible Investment

1. Introduction

AllianceBernstein L.P. (“AllianceBernstein” or “we”) is appointed by our clients as an investment manager with a fiduciary responsibility to help them achieve their investment objectives over the long term. Generally, our clients’ objective is to maximize the financial return of their portfolios within appropriate risk parameters. AllianceBernstein has long recognized that environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) issues can impact the performance of investment portfolios. Accordingly, we have sought to integrate ESG factors into our investment process to the extent that the integration of such factors is consistent with our fiduciary duty to help our clients achieve their investment objectives and protect their economic interests.

Our policy draws a distinction between how the Principles for Responsible Investment (“PRI” or “Principles”), and Socially Responsible Investing (“SRI”) incorporate ESG factors. PRI is based on the premise that, because ESG issues can affect investment performance, appropriate consideration of ESG issues and engagement regarding them is firmly within the bounds of a mainstream investment manager’s fiduciary duties to its clients. Furthermore, PRI is intended to be applied only in ways that are consistent with those mainstream fiduciary duties.

SRI, which refers to a spectrum of investment strategies that seek to integrate ethical, moral, sustainability and other non-financial factors into the investment process, generally involves exclusion and/or divestment, as well as investment guidelines that restrict investments. AllianceBernstein may accept such guideline restrictions upon client request.

2. Approach to ESG

Our long-standing policy has been to include ESG factors in our extensive fundamental research and consider them carefully when we believe they are material to our forecasts and investment decisions. If we determine that these aspects of an issuer’s past, current or anticipated behavior are material to its future expected returns, we address these concerns in our forecasts, research reviews, investment decisions and engagement. In addition, we have well-developed proxy voting policies that incorporate ESG issues and engagement.
3. **Commitment to the PRI**

In recent years, we have gained greater clarity on how the PRI initiative, based on information from PRI Advisory Council members and from other signatories, provides a framework for incorporating ESG factors into investment research and decision-making. Furthermore, our industry has become, over time, more aware of the importance of ESG factors. We acknowledge these developments and seek to refine what has been our process in this area.

After careful consideration, we determined that becoming a PRI signatory would enhance our current ESG practices and align with our fiduciary duties to our clients as a mainstream investment manager. Accordingly, we became a signatory, effective November 1, 2011.

In signing the PRI, AllianceBernstein as an investment manager publicly commits to adopt and implement all six Principles, where consistent with our fiduciary responsibilities, and to make progress over time on implementation of the Principles.

The six Principles are:

1. **We will incorporate ESG issues into investment research and decision-making processes.**

   **AllianceBernstein Examples:** ESG issues are included in the research analysis process. In some cases, external service providers of ESG-related tools are utilized; we have conducted proxy voting training and will have continued and expanded training for investment professionals to incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes across our firm.

2. **We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and practices.**

   **AllianceBernstein Examples:** We are active owners through our proxy voting process (for additional information, please refer to our *Statement of Policies and Procedures for Proxy Voting Manual*); we engage issuers on ESG matters in our investment research process (we define “engagement” as discussions with management about ESG issues when they are, or we believe they are reasonably likely to become, material).

3. **We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest.**

   **AllianceBernstein Examples:** Generally, we support transparency regarding ESG issues when we conclude the disclosure is reasonable. Similarly, in proxy voting, we will support shareholder initiatives and resolutions promoting ESG disclosure when we conclude the disclosure is reasonable.
4. We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment industry.

AllianceBernstein Examples: By signing the PRI, we have taken an important first step in promoting acceptance and implementation of the six Principles within our industry.

5. We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles.

AllianceBernstein Examples: We will engage with clients and participate in forums with other PRI signatories to better understand how the PRI are applied in our respective businesses. As a PRI signatory, we have access to information, tools and other signatories to help ensure that we are effective in our endeavors to implement the PRI.

6. We will report on our activities and progress towards implementing the Principles.

AllianceBernstein Examples: We will respond to the 2012 PRI questionnaire and disclose PRI scores from the questionnaire in response to inquiries from clients and in requests for proposals; we will provide examples as requested concerning active ownership activities (voting, engagement or policy dialogue).

4. RI Committee

Our firm’s RI Committee provides AllianceBernstein stakeholders, including employees, clients, prospects, consultants and service providers alike, with a resource within our firm on which they can rely for information regarding our approach to ESG issues and how those issues are incorporated in different ways by the PRI and SRI. Additionally, the RI Committee is responsible for assisting AllianceBernstein personnel to further implement our firm’s RI policies and practices, and, over time, to make progress on implementing all six Principles.

The RI Committee has a diverse membership, including senior representatives from investments, distribution/sales and legal. The Committee is chaired by Linda Giuliano, Senior Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer-Equities.
If you have questions or desire additional information about this Policy, we encourage you to contact the RI Committee at RIinquiries@alliancebernstein.com or reach out to a Committee member.