Many equity investors are enamored by the idea of timing factors to enhance returns, but our research suggests that it’s not the best way to enhance active equity performance. And skill in factor timing may not be a good gauge of future success.
Rising Interest in Factor Timing… But a Lack of Research
There’s an allure to the idea of exploiting factor performance, but factors can be fickle—whipsawing portfolios with sudden, volatile shifts. It’s a major reason why most active equity managers don’t have factor timing in their toolkits. Despite the challenges, big swings in factors such as beta, size and momentum since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) have recharged interest. The asset-management industry has responded with research, strategies and vehicles to encourage and facilitate factor timing.
To put it bluntly, the idea of factor timing is back in vogue.
Unfortunately, research into the extent to which factor timing drives active returns—and whether it indicates manager skill—has been fairly limited. To address these topics, we extended our prime-alpha research. The original prime-alpha work indicated that the residual return remaining after stripping out the benchmark return and common factor exposures is persistent. That may make prime alpha a useful indicator of equity managers’ skill.
If we take the research a bit further, we can separate the individual components of active equity returns into strategic factor contributions, tactical factor contributions (factor timing) and security selection. By slicing the return contributors this way, we can take a closer look at what factor timers are actually bringing to the table.
Insights from Active Equity Return Patterns
Running this analysis on active large-cap equity manager returns over a fairly long period—1991 through 2017—yields important high-level insights about the patterns and composition of active equity returns:
Factor success ebbed and flowed. Strategic factor exposures added slightly to active returns but suffered through ebbs and flows along the way. Factor timing was actually a slight negative over the period: 2007 and 2009 were very strong years, for example, while the late 1990s were a struggle.
Factor exposure is fairly widespread. Across the full 27-year period, strategic factor exposures and factor timing each explained 25% to 30% of returns—whether good or bad—and stock selection explained the most, at 45%. The percentages vary across managers and by time period, but it’s clear that factor exposures play a sizable role in returns. Even stock pickers have factor exposures that influence performance.
The impact of individual factor-timing decisions is wide-ranging. There’s a huge variation in the impact of individual factor contributions over time (Display). In 1999, during the tech-bubble buildup, a value overweight hurt returns. During the ensuing crash, managers were generally overweight companies that were conservative in their business investments versus aggressive firms, which helped returns. Finally, at the 2008 depths of the GFC, portfolios were generally underweight profitability, which was a negative.